The
Reluctant Navy: History of the US Navy,
1775-1815
The United States Navy is the strongest
navy in the world.[1] Its
origin and that of its lineal predecessor, the Continental Navy, were far from
certain. “For no nation was ever less
willing to create a navy.”[2] The debate
raged in Congress for ten days. Most
southern delegates felt that a navy would only benefit the north while still
others felt that if they formed a navy that it would bring the wrath of the
British Navy down upon them. Still
others felt that the construction of a navy would be detrimental to
reconciliation with the British. Pro-naval
representatives led by John Adams prevailed.
On October 13, 1775 the Continental Congress voted to construct two
sailing vessels with ten carriage guns and swivel guns. These vessels were to be manned by eighty
sailors and to send them on a three month cruise to intercept British shipping
of war materials to the British army in America. It was this legislation that served as
the birth certificate of the Continental Navy.[3] Even after the birth of the navy it took
several armed conflicts beginning with the American Revolution and ending with
the War of 1812 before the United States learned the importance of maintaining
a reliable navy.
The formation of the Continental
Navy was not the first significant naval action. That honor goes to Captain James
Mugford. On May 17, 1775, Mugford, of
the sloop Franklin, captured the
transport HMS Hope and its cargo of “…1,000
barrels of gunpowder and a like number of muskets…” while off the coast of
Boston.
[4] Then Colonel Benedict Arnold on May 18, 1775
captured the English sloop Betsy on
Lake Champlain, which he renames Enterprise. By October 13, 1775 at least ten similar
actions had occurred.[5] The fact that naval action had already been taken made it easy for the Continental
Congress to vote for the creation of a navy.
On November 2, 1775, the Continental
Congress voted to spend $100,000 to buy, arm, and rename eight merchant
vessels: Alfred (24), Columbus (18),
Andrew Doria (14), Cabot (14), Providence (12), Hornet
(10), and Fly (8). Then on November 10, 1775, the Continental
Congress passed a resolution to raise two battalions of marines to act as
landing forces for the newly formed fleet.
On February 18, 1776, Esek Hopkins
led the Continental Navy’s first sortie in strength against the British. His orders from congress were to sail to the
Chesapeake Bay to deal with a small fleet lead by Lord Dunmore, the former Royal
governor of Virginia, who had caused difficulty in the area. Hopkins, however,
chose to pursue another mission. He set
sail for New Providence, Bahamas where there was a large stockpile of military
provisions. Hopkins’s fleet consisted of his flagship:
the Alfred (24), Columbus (24), Andrew Doria (14), Cabot (14), Providence (12), Hornet
(10), Wasp (8), and Fly (8). The second night, February 19, 1776, the
fleet encountered a severe gale where during the heavy weather the Fly and Hornet collided and lagged far behind the rest of the fleet. Hopkins proceeded to Great Abaco Island where
he waited in vain for two days for the two stricken ships. Then on March
3, 1776, while at Great Abaco, Hopkins took two island sloops. He had planned to man with 200 marines and
fifty sailors and have the two ships sail into the port and surprise the
unsuspecting British. However,
Hopkins was not aware he had allowed his ships to rise above the horizon, thereby
losing the element of surprise.[6]
He diverted the sloops to the far
end of the island where the Continental Navy made its first amphibious
landing. After an overland march, the
marines were able to take the British garrison, along with eighty-eight
cannons, fifteen mortars, and a small portion of gunpowder. However, because of Hopkins’s careless
approach, the British were able to move 150 casks of gunpowder out of reach of
the attacking Continentals. Despite the
misfortune that had, thus far, hampered
the mission, Hopkins was able to capture a good deal of military material that
the Continental Army could make good use.
It took two weeks for the Continentals to get their booty loaded aboard their
ships. On
March 17, 1776, Commodore Hopkins set sail for Philadelphia; however, as the
heavily laden fleet sail for their home port there was an outbreak of small
pox. The crew of the Wasp was especially hit hard and lagged
behind after encountering bad weather off the coast of Georgia. On April 6,
1776 the remaining ships of the Continental fleet came upon the frigate HMS Glasgow (20) which should have been
easy prey for the Continental fleet; however, the Glasgow was able to escape while inflicting damage on the
Continentals. During the four-hour battle, Hopkins issued no orders
other than to recall the other ships.[7]
During the engagement, the Alfred’s
steering was severely damaged. Two days
later, Hopkins’ fleet limped into port at New London, Connecticut ending the
squadron’s only sortie. The squadron was
never reconstituted due to a lack of manpower
because the majority of able bodied sailors preferred to sail on better paying
privateers.[8]
On March 19, 1775 Samuel Chase
entered a motion that the Continental Navy be able to target British shipping. The motion was
ultimately tabled. On March 23,
1776 the Continental Congress passed a resolution that would allow for
privateering against British shipping by issuing letters of marque.[9] In all, 2,000 privateers were commissioned by
the Continental Congress or individual states, which accounted for more than
2,200 captured British merchant ships.[10] When compared to the Continental Navy that
captured fewer than 200 ships.[11] Privateers proved to be a double-edged sword. While privateers captured British shipping
that provided much-needed supplies to the
war effort. In addition, Benjamin
Franklin also offered a high bounty to privateers for British seaman so that
they may be exchanged for captured Continental
seaman.[12] However, privateers were only on the fringes
of the war effort and kept to sea only when profitable to the privateer. The privateer also proved detrimental to the
Continental Navy in that it drew away already limited personnel resources.[13] Though privateers had a noticeable effect on
shipping costs, the insurance went from
three percent of total combined cargo value to twenty-seven percent and freight
rates jumped from nine shillings a ton to thirteen shillings. Though this
may have added to the unpopularity of the war in Britain, it was not enough to
end the war and was not even enough to stop the flow of goods from England to
North America and the Caribbean.[14] Continental privateers operated on both sides
of the Atlantic as well as in the Caribbean.[15] However, most privateers stayed close to home. Some of the favored hunting grounds of the
privateers were the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and the West Indies, though they
were far from the only locations where privateers were found.
Privateers were not the only force
that competed with the Continental Navy for men. Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Virginia, Maryland, Georgia, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island
all fielded navies.[16] The size and makeup of each state’s navy varied though most states believed ships
ranging between eighteen to twenty guns were the optimal balance between speed
and firepower. Though based on the performance of the
state’s navies, this seemed to be a very
optimistic position based on the amount of success the state navies
attained. Though the states’ navies tended to have a handful of ships suitable for
operations at sea. The vast majority of
state navies were made up of row galleys, whale boats, and other small craft
more suited for river and coastal defense.
The exception to this was the navy of
South Carolina, which fielded a navy that had the largest ships that served on the
Continental side. The frigate South Carolina armed with twenty-eight 36-pounders
and twelve 12-pounders although initially
rated at forty guns. The South Carolina entered the war in
1781. Its initial cruise was in the
North Sea. It next appeared in the
Caribbean as part of a large combined fleet of Spanish and Continental ships in
an attack on Nassau, Bahamas. On December 20, 1782, the South Carolina was taken off the Delaware Cape by the Dromede (44), Astra (32), and Quebec
(32).[17]
In New England, the largest ship fielded
by a state navy was the Massachusetts frigate Protector (28), which saw service in the Massachusetts state navy
until May 1781. On her first cruise in
1779, the Protector engaged the loyalist
privateer Admiral Duff (32) and after
a long hard fight that left both ships severely damaged, the Admiral Duff sank. Soon after the battle, the Protector encountered the HMS Thames (32). Given the Protector’s
state of disrepair, she, fortunately, was
able to allude capture. However, in May
1781 the Protector was captured by
the HMS Roebuck (44) and the HMS Medea (24). The Protector
was taken into the Royal Navy where
she was renamed the HMS Hussar (28)
and served until 1783.[18]
Though the most important colonial
naval force was the Continental Army.
George Washington, acting entirely on his authority, acquired eight
small vessels in 1775 and 1776. The
first ship was the Hannah, lightly
armed with just four 4-pounders. He also
acquired the Lynch, the Franklin, the Lee, the Warren, the Harrison, and the Hancock.[19] In total “Washington’s fleet” captured
fifty-five enemy craft including four troop transports carrying a total of 300
British soldiers. The most important single ship-to-ship engagement between
the Continentals and the British occurred on November 27, 1775 when Washington’s
schooner Lee, captained by John
Manley, captured the British ordinance brig HMS
Nancy, which was loaded with 2,000 muskets with bayonets, 31 tons of musket
balls, 30,000 round shot of various weights, 100,000 musket flints, and a 13
inch mortar. So pleased was
Washington with the prize he stated “…[gave] new life to our camp...”[20] While the Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the
Admiralty, saw the capture of the Nancy
as “a fatal event.”[21]
As important as “Washington’s Fleet”
was because of its victories, another Continental general’s “fleet” was perhaps
even more important in defeat. During
1776, Benedict Arnold worked to secure Lake
Champlain and the surrounding water ways to insure that New England would not
be cut off from the rest of the colonies by the British. Governor General Guy Carelton attempted to do
this on October 11, 1776 when he sent a force of thirty-four ships against
Arnold’s twenty-three. The two
forces met at about eleven o’clock in the morning,
and the battle raged until about six o’clock in the evening and the British
withdrew early on October 12, 1776.
Arnold decided to make for Fort Crown Point on October 13, 1776. The British were able to overtake Arnold and
after another five hours of battle, Arnold’s fleet was reduced to four gondolas
which Arnold beached in a small creek and
put to the torch. He and his remaining
men made for Fort Crown Point over land though
Arnold’s fleet was lost to the British. The fact that the British had to build a fleet to deal
with Arnold’s delayed Carleton’s advance out of Canada too long into the
campaigning season. He was forced to
halt his advance until the spring of 1777, turning Arnold’s tactical defeat
into a strategic victory.[22]
Though
the Continental Navy faced obstacles that would prove overwhelming, it was the
proving ground for the man that credited with being the “father” of the United
States Navy, John Paul Jones. He
was born John Paul in 1747 in Kirkcudbrightshire, Scotland. He went to sea at an early age (thirteen
years old), and by the age of twenty-one,
Jones had become a merchant ship captain.[23] He then secured
a commission in the Continental Navy as First Lieutenant of the Alfred[24] where he was responsible for raising the first “national”
flag to fly over a Continental Navy vessel.[25] Jones served well on the Alfred and was rewarded with
the command of the Providence (12). While in command of the Providence, Jones in short order captured sixteen prizes. This cemented Jones’s reputation.[26] Then in March of 1777, the Marine committee
gave Jones command of the sloop of war
Ranger (18), which was still under construction.
On November 1, 1777, Jones set sail to
Europe carrying news of General John Burgoyne’s surrender of 5,700 troops at
Saratoga. This information led to the
French coming into the war on the side of the colonists. This
gave the colonists a base to strike at England in its home waters.[27] On April 10, 1778, Jones set sail for British
waters where he captured two prizes while sinking two others. He then raided the village of White Haven
though to little avail. Then Jones took
the ranger to St. Mary’s Isle, the home of the Lord of Selkirk. Jones planned to capture the Lord and trade
him for colonial prisoners. This plan
failed when Selkirk proved to be away. The next day, April 24, 1778, Jones encountered
the British sloop of war Drake. The two well-matched ships dueled for over an
hour during which the captain of the Drake
was killed while the British sloop
was forced to surrender. After the encounter with the Drake, Jones returned to France.[28] Though the strategic value of Jones’s raid
was not great, the raids did not go unnoticed in England where the public soon
began putting pressure on the government for more protection.[29]
Ten months later all of the prisoners
taken by Jones as well as some taken by the French were exchanged for colonial
prisoners. It is the first time that
there was a successful exchange between the colonials and the British.[30] While Jones was successful at sea, he was not
popular among his men. Upon his return
to France, seventy-seven sailors and twenty-eight warrant and petty officers
complained to the commissioners in Paris that Jones was arbitrary, bad
tempered, and insufferable. This led to the ranger and its crew returning to America.[31] Jones remained in France where Benjamin
Franklin promised Jones a new frigate.
This frigate never materialized; however, in late 1778 the Colonial Navy
purchased a Dutch merchantman named Duc
de Duras. The ship which Jones renamed the Bonhomme Richard. The Bonhomme
Richard was rated for forty guns; however, it was armed with six 9-pounders
on its upper deck, twenty-eight 12-pounders on its main deck, and six ancient
18-pounders mounted so low on the ship that they could only be rolled out in a
flat calm. Jones is also allowed
to choose his crew of 380, most of whom were British deserters and released
prisoners of war.[32]
On August 14, 1779, Jones in the Bonhomme
Richard led a squadron made up of two privateers, three French navy
vessels, and one other Continental Navy vessel.
Soon after the fleet sailed, each captain began acting on their
accord. Then
on September 23, 1779 off Flamborough Head, Jones’ Flotilla came upon a convoy of ships escorted by two British warships,
the Countess of Scarborough (22) and the
Serapis (44). The Pallas
(32) engaged the Countess of Scarborough
while Jones in Bonhomme Richard
engaged the Serapis, which initiated
three hours of the hardest fighting ever seen under sail.[33] The battle began just after sunset with the
two ships sailing parallel to each other exchanging broadsides with each ship
attempting to pass astern of the other to gain an advantage. The two ships were
so close that their rigging became entangled. The captain of the Serapis, Richard Pearson, then asked Jones “Has your ship struck?”[34] Jones replied, “I have not yet begun to
fight!”[35] The ships broke away from each other and
exchanged broadsides only to become once again
entangled in each other’s rigging while still firing at each other for two
hours. By this time, Jones had lost all
his guns but three 9-pounders. Though
sharp shooters in the Bonhome Richard
were able to sweep the Serapis’s
upper decks while Jones instructed his gunners on his remaining cannon to
target the mast of the Serapis. About this time,
the Serapis was rocked by a major
explosion as a sailor aloft in the Bonhome
Richard’s rigging was able to lob a grenade among neglected powder charges
left on the deck of the Serapis. By 10:30 p.m. Pearson had struck his
colors. Shortly after he did, Serapis’s main mast fell, though Pearson
had surrendered. The Bonhomme Richard was taking
on water, and Jones was forced to transfer his flag to the Serapis, while his crew valiantly tried to save their ship but to
no avail. At about ten o’clock in the
morning on September 24, 1779, the Bonhomme
Richard slipped below the surface.
The battle off Flamborough Head was the
high water mark for the Continental Navy during the Revolutionary War.[36] The Birmingham Gazette stated, “I doubt not
but you have heard of the alarming Situation we have been in since Tuesday
night; but thank God, as yet we have been only terrified by this Paul Jones.”[37] The last time Jones served in battle for the
Continental Navy; he was the captain of
the fourteen gun sloop Ariel, and he captured the British
privateer Triumph off the West Indies
on December 14, 1780.[38]
In 1778, France declared war on
Britain. In 1779, they were joined by
the Spanish and in 1780 the Dutch. That
same year the rest of Europe formed the (Anti-British) League of
Neutrality. The American Revolution had
become a war that stretched around the world.[39] By this time,
the naval war had become largely war by proxy for the Continentals.[40] By April 11, 1783 the Continental Congress
declares the Revolutionary War at an end.[41]
The new country of the United States of
America found itself weak and in debt
which exacerbated the situation. In
order to raise much-needed capital all
but one frigate, the Alliance, had
been sold off. Then on August 1, 1785,
the Alliance was sold at auction for
$26,000 and with that the Continental Navy ceased to exist.[42] For four years,
the United States was a country without a navy.
During this time, American trade in the
Mediterranean was targeted by pirates operating in the Barbary States of Algiers,
Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli. They
realized that American shipping was no longer protected by the Royal Navy and
that the United States did not have a navy of its own. The Articles of Confederation, in fact, did
not specifically give the right to maintain a navy; however, in Article IX it
does give Congress the power to issue letters of marque. This weak document and the lack of funds in concert with the same
sectional rivalries that had hindered the formation of the Continental Navy
conspired against the formation of a naval force.[43]
In 1789, the United States ratified a new
constitution that specifically authorized Congress “to provide and maintain a navy”. It would be another conflict, the French
Revolution in 1793, which expedited the founding of the United States
Navy. When
a truce between Portugal and Algiers, negotiated by the British, ended
Portugal’s blockade of Gibraltar which allowed the Barbary pirates to come out
into the Atlantic where they promptly captured eleven American ships in the
first two months following the end of the blockade. The British position on the removal of the
blockade was that Portugal, their ally, could put their ships to other
uses. Many Americans saw it as an attack
on American commerce. On January 2, 1794,
the House of Representatives approved a resolution to create a naval force
adequate to protect the commerce of the United States. It passed by just two votes with northern and
tidewater representatives voting for the proposition and southern and inland
members voting against the resolution.
The exception was a few South Carolinians who represented mercantile
interests.[44] Opponents of the resolution claimed it would
only serve to embroil the United States in foreign affairs and would endanger
the liberties of the people. While
proponents countered that a navy would be able to act not only to protect commerce but to ensure our neutrality and that
it operated overseas. The navy could
scarcely be an instrument of domestic tyranny.
Finally approved on March 27, 1794, the Navy Act authorized the
procurement of six frigates: four 44-gun
and two 36-gun. However, as a provision
in the act if peace terms were concluded
between the Dey of Algiers and the United States, work on the ships were to be
summarily halted.[45]
In conjunction with the Naval Act of 1794,
George Washington appointed the first six naval officers of the United States
Navy: John Berry, Richard Dale, Samuel
Nicholson, Silas Talbot, Joshua Barney, and Thomas Truxtun.[46] Shortly after the
Navy Act passed, Congress authorized the expenditure of $800,000 to obtain a
treaty with the Algerians. Unfortunately
for the supporters of the Navy in September 1795, a treaty was signed with the
Dey of Algiers, which meant all work on the frigates was to come to a halt. President
Washington strongly opposed this on the grounds it would be wasteful. After much debate in Congress, a compromise
was finally reached allowing for the completion of two 44-gun frigates, the Constitution and the United States, and one 36-gun frigate, the
Constellation.[47] That same year in his last annual address to
Congress, George Washington again endorsed the creation of a navy for the
protection of American commerce and the national reputation.[48]
On July 11, 1797, the forty-four gun
frigate United States was formally
commissioned as the first warship of the United States Navy. John Barry, veteran of the Revolutionary War,
was named captain. In September of 1797,
the Constellation (36) and the following
month the Constitution (44) was
launched.
These ships would soon be put to the
test. Due
to the growing tensions between the United States and the new Republic of
France over what appeared, to the French, as improving relations between the
British and the United States failure to continue payment of debt incurred by
the United States during the Revolutionary War. In 1796, the French government recalled its
minister and announced it would seek satisfaction against American
shipping. During the winter of 1796,
French privateers captured several
hundred American ships. This issue was brought to a head in 1797 when
President John Adams revealed the details of failed negotiations with the
French government, historically known as the XYZ Affair. This led Congress to direct the fledgling
United States Navy to undertake active operations and in 1798, Congress also
authorized the purchase or construction of additional warships.
However, there were not enough votes to
declare war on France but on July 7, 1797 Congress voted to rescind its
treaties with France.[49] The so-called
Quasi-War had
begun. That same day near Great
Egg Harbor, New Jersey, Captain Stephen Decatur of the sloop Delaware (20) captured the French
privateer La Croyable (14). In 1798, the President was empowered to
purchase an additional two dozen warships armed with between eighteen to
thirty-two guns. Eight small cutters
belonging to the forerunner of the Coast Guard were also added to the
navy. The navy was also supplemented by warships that were paid for by patriotic
citizens in many sea ports who purchased what amounted to the first United
States war bonds. The Essex, Philadelphia, and Boston
were among ships paid for in this manner.[50] By the end of 1798, the United States Navy
had cleared the French from North American waters. The French had retreated to the
Caribbean. Somewhat ironically the United States Navy was aided by the Royal Navy’s
blockade of French ports. This kept most
of France’s larger warships on the far side of the Atlantic leaving only a
handful of frigates and smaller vessels as well as a swarm of privateers, a
force that was on equal footing with the United States Navy.
On April 30, 1798, President Adams
appointed Benjamin Stoddert as the first Secretary of the Navy. Stoddert felt the navy’s strength would be
most effective if the fleet were organized
into units ranging from three to ten ships.
Though this was not always the case.
An example of this occurred in February 1799, when the Constellation (36) engaged the forty gun
frigate L’Insurgente,
which was reputed to be the fastest ship
in the French Navy. The Constellation,
which was captained by Thomas Truxtun, was able to swing across the bow of the L’Insurgente pouring murderous fire into
the hull of the enemy vessel at close range.
The battle raged for about an hour and a half and left the L’Insurgente a battered wreck.
The Constellation
was also involved in another noteworthy battle which occurred on February 1,
1800. When the Constellation came upon the fifty-four gun French frigate La Vengence, which led the Constellation on a day-long chase but
eventually the two vessels were within a pistol shot of each other. The battle raged for the next five hours and
shortly before one o’clock in the morning the French ship’s guns fell
silent. Believing they had struck, the Constellation slid alongside. It was at this
time that Truxtun discovered that the Constellation’s
main mast was unsupported by rigging and despite all attempts the Constellation’s crew was unable to save
the mast. In the confusion, the La Vengence limped off under the cover
of darkness but before the La Vengence
could make port in Curacao, it too lost her mainmast as well as her fore and
mizzen top masts. The captain
described the Constellation as a two deck ship of the line.[51]
The year 1800 proved to be very productive
for the young United States Navy. It
captured forty-nine French privateers and the frigate La Berceau without losing one United States vessel.[52] By February 3, 1800, the Quasi-War had come to an end. The United States Navy had acquitted themselves well, with the United States sixteen
warships capturing eighty-five French privateers and two frigates while only
losing one sloop. The end of the Quasi War also brought about a
reduction of an already small navy. On February
18, 1801, Stoddert resigned, and five
months would pass before a replacement was named. On March 3, 1801 President Adams signed the
Peace Establishment Act which authorized the retention
of thirteen warships for the United States Navy but only six of these ships
were to remain on active duty. The act
also reduced the officer corp. Though
the “peace” was short lived.[53]
The Barbary States remained an area of
contention for the United States. Throughout
the remainder of 1801, the United States Navy and Barbary vessels skirmished.[54] On February 6, 1802, Congress voted to lift
all the restrictions imposed by the Peace Establishment Act. Then on May 15, 1802 the Pasha of Tripoli
declares war on the United States.[55] During 1802,
the navy was largely ineffective primarily because the draft of the American
ships was too great to come close to the cities. To remedy this
situation, funds were acquired for
four shallow draft vessels. The brigs, Siren
and Argus, each carried two 12-pound
cannons that would be used for ship-to-ship fighting and sixteen 24-pound
carronades designed for shore bombardments.
The schooners, Nautilus and Vixen, also carried two 12-pound cannons
and twelve 18-pound carronades, with the frigates able to patrol offshore and
the new shallow draft vessels patrolling close to shore.
On June 21, 1803 Edward Preble in the Constitution took command of the
Mediterranean fleet. A very able seaman
and strict disciplinarian which made him unpopular with his officers at first
but as the cruise continued his junior officer’s minds began to change.[56] On October 3, 1803,
Preble arrived in Malta and met up with Captain William Bainbridge of the
frigate Philadelphia and gave him
orders to leave for Tripoli at once along with the Vixen to blockade the city, which he did.
On October 31, 1803, Bainbridge and the Philadelphia were on station off Tripoli when a ship was sighted trying to run
the blockade. Bainbridge began to give
chase and for more than three hours the chase continued. Logs show that during the chase, Bainbridge
was constantly casting the lead and
reporting depths between seven to ten fathoms.
As the Philadelphia came to
the mouth of the harbor, Bainbridge called off the chase and turned into the
wind. Though,
unfortunately, as he made the turn the ship lurched to a stop.
The ship had run aground.
Bainbridge immediately attempted to remove the stricken ship to no
avail. The Tripolitans could see the
distressed ship and made for their boats
to capture the unexpected prize.[57]
Preble learned of the loss on November 24,
1803 from the HMS Amazon. Preble at once
sailed for Malta and upon his arrival sent a crew ashore. They soon returned with correspondence from
Bainbridge that not only confirmed the capture of the Philadelphia but that the Tripolatins had floated her and had begun
to refit her. Upon hearing this,
Preble sailed for Sicily where he had set a rendezvous with the Enterprise and Nautilus and the supply ship Traveler. The night before Christmas Eve, the Constitution was on station near Tripoli
with the Enterprise when soon after
first light lookouts reported a ship on the horizon. Preble ordered the British ensign sent aloft and
gave chase and caught the Tripolitan ketch
Mastico and sent it to Sicily with
the Enterprise as an escort. On Christmas Day
1803, a storm blew the Constitution
off station and battered the ship for several days. Preble was forced to return to Sicily where
the ketch is renamed Intrepid and
refitted for a mission to destroy the captured Philadelphia.
The Intrepid
and the Siren sailed for Tripoli
on February 3, 1804 and by the seventh the two ships were off Tripoli but
weather conditions prevented the Intrepid
from entering the harbor. Then finally
on February 16, 1804 Stephen Decatur Junior, in command of the Intrepid, gave the go ahead to the
mission. Decatur came alongside the Philadelphia
before they are seen by the Tripolitans on board the captured ship. After a short but savage fight the Americans prevail, and Decatur was able to fire the Philadelphia and escape without
incident.[58]
Throughout the rest of 1804, Commodore
Preble continued to press the Pasha of Tripoli
aggressively, shelling the city ten times between August 3, 1804 and
September 2, 1804. A week later
Commodore Preble is relieved by Commodore Samuel Baron, who is relieved by
Commodore John Rogers on May 22, 1805, neither of who were as aggressive as
Commodore Preble. By June 3, 1805 agreement is reached ending the war. The United States agreed to pay $60,000 for
the release of all prisoners, and Tripoli waived any claims to future
tribute. The
next day Captain Bainbridge and the rest of the Philadelphia crew were freed.[59] With the end of the Tripolitan War, the young
United States Navy again acquitted itself
well. However,
more importantly the Tripolitan War served as a finishing school for
many young officers and perhaps more importantly, unlike after the Quasi War, the
officer corp was reduced but it was not
decimated. Congress authorized 13
captains, 9 master commandants, and 925
sailors.[60]
Beginning in 1806, the young United States
Navy’s main source of conflict is the British Navy with a handful of issues,
most of which concerned the impressment of American seaman. The two most
serious of these events occurred on June 22, 1807 when the HMS Leopard fired upon the USS
Chesapeake after it refused to allow the British to come aboard to search
for deserters. Then on May 16, 1811 off
the New Jersey coast the USS President
encountered an unidentified vessel and broadsides are exchanged before the ship
is identified as the HMS Little Belt. This action acts as a prelude to the War of 1812.[61]
The War of 1812 occurred
primarily for reasons tied to maritime trade and American sovereignty on the
open seas. Whether the issue of
impressment of American sailors, the looting of American shipping, or the
British regulations known as the orders-in-council that sharply curtailed
United States trade in Europe.
These actions were referred to by President James Madison in an address
to Congress on November 5, 1811 when he spoke of Britain’s “hostile inflexibility”.[62] On June 18, 1812 Congress declared war
pitting the 17 warships of the United States Navy against the 1,048 warships of
the Royal Navy. The Americans main line
of defense was its original six frigates, while the British had the largest
fleet in the world.
The American Navy enjoyed numerous
successes in 1812 and the first half of 1813.
The greatest success came when the United States frigate Constitution (44) defeated the British
frigate HMS Guerriere (31) on August
19, 1812.[63] Over the past twenty years, the British had fought 200 single-ship
engagements and had only lost five. So
Captain Dacres unhesitatingly offered battle to the American frigate that he
encountered off the coast of Newfoundland.
For forty-five minutes, the two ships
maneuvered until at six o’clock in the evening.
Captain Isaac Hull gave the order to fire sending double shot into the Guerriere within fifteen minutes of
fighting, the Guerriere’s mizzen mast
had been shot away, her sides riddled, and sail and rigging shredded. A sailor on board the Constitution is reported to see British shot bounced off the side
of the Constitution. It is reported he exclaimed, “Her sides are
made of iron!”[64] Hull then pulled ahead of the British vessel
and crossed her bow where Hull raked her with two broadsides, soon after the Guerriere’s
foremast fell taking the main mast with it. At this time, Hull ordered his men to cease
fire and sent an officer to inquire if Dacres had struck his colors. Dacres replied, “I don’t know. Our mizzenmast is gone, our mainmast is gone; an upon the whole, you may say we have struck our flag.”[65] The loss of the Guerriere was a major shock in Britain. Then in London The Times said the news “spread a degree of gloom through the town,
which it was painful to observe.”[66] Captain Dacres in a letter wrote,
…I hope, in
considering the circumstances, you will think the Ship entrusted to my charge
was properly defended; the unfortunate loss of our Masts, the absence of the
third lieutenant, second Lieutenant of Marines, three Midshipmen, and twenty
four Men considerably weakened our Crew, and we only muster’d at Quarters 244
Men and 19 Boys, on coming into action; the Enemy had such an advantage from
his Marines and Riflemen, when close and his superior sailing enabled him to
choose his distance.[67]
The open seas were not the only place that the navy won important battles. Important battles were also won on the Great
Lakes. The best known of these battles being
between Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry’s squadron on Lake Erie and his British
counterpart Commodore Robert Barclay.[68] On September 10, 1813 Perry and Barclay
met. Perry bore down on Barclay from
Windward under a banner that read “Don’t give up the ship” onboard his flagship
the Lawrence. Perry fought until the vessel lay dead in the
water, and only 19 of his 142 man crew
remained fit to fight. Perry’s
second-in-command, Jesse Elliott, who had inexplicably kept his ship the Niagara well clear of the vicious two-hour fight, now cautiously approached the Lawrence. Perry, under fire, had himself rowed to the Niagara and took command and ordered Elliott to be rowed to the now
battered Lawrence. Perry in his new flagship managed to “cross
the T” on the British line. From this position, Perry was able to lay down a
withering barrage of raking fire. By
three o’clock in the afternoon on September 10, 1813 Barclay had surrendered,
and for the first time in history a British commander surrendered an entire
squadron. “The victory of Lake
Erie was most important, both in its material results and in its moral effect.”[69] This victory made the British position in
Michigan and Ohio untenable.[70] Then later that month Perry transported
General William H. Harrison’s 4,500 men to the Canada shore where they promptly
retook Detroit and pursued the British to the Thames River.[71] After the battle,
Perry was promoted to Captain and Congress voted $250,000 in prize money for
Perry and his men. This was put into
perspective when Hull and the crew of the Constitution
had only received $50,000 for its victory over the Guerriere.[72]
As in the Revolutionary War a major part
of the naval strategy called for the use of privateers to disrupt British shipping and the Americans putout over 526 privately owned armed
vessels. These vessels did not only
affect the supply of British in North America but also in Europe.[73] One of the most successful privateers was the
fifteen-gun Yankee owned by James
DeWolf from Bristol, Rhode Island. It
was responsible for eight vessels taken worth $300,000 while the Rossie (15), commanded by Joshua Barney
of Baltimore, captured eighteen vessels worth about $1.5 million.[74] In the first six months of the war, American
privateers captured 450 British ships.
During the first year of the war, both
sides’ expectations were not met. For
the Americans taking Canada, was supposed to be
a “mere matter of marching”, had proved extremely illusive. While at sea where the Royal Navy was thought
to be invincible, the war had gone very well for the Americans small navy. In Britain the Admiralty ordered British frigates not, “to engage, single handed, the
larger Class of American ships; which though they may be called
Frigates…[resemble] Line of Battle Ships.”[75] The British government also ordered all
merchantmen in the Atlantic to sail in convoy.[76] Unfortunately for the American Navy this was
its high watermark in the conflict.
By July 1813, Britain had increased its
naval presence in North America to 129 including ten ships of the line. With this increase in ships, the British were
able to do what they never had done during the Revolutionary War; blockade the
entire Atlantic Coast.[77] After the summer of 1813, the navy’s opportunities were few and far in between. The only American warship of any size at sea
was the Essex,
and it was all the way in the Pacific harassing British whaling. Only small warships were able to slip past
the blockade, and that became less
frequent as the year went by.
By 1814, only the United States was left
to draw the ire of Britain with Napoleon defeated.[78] The
British were ready for peace and on December 24, 1814 delegates from Britain
and the United States met in Ghent, Belgium and signed a peace treaty ending the War of 1812. Though there were battles still fought for
the next two months they were of no consequence as the treaty of Ghent was
ratified by the United States Senate on February 17, 1815.[79]
With the end of the War of 1812 there was
little time for peace for the Barbary States was
again preying on neutral shipping and in February 1815 the United States
declared war on Algiers.[80] From the time of the revolution to the end of
the War of 1812, the United States learned an important lesson on the need for
a navy. At the start of the War of 1812,
the navy was the only prepared branch of the military. While during both the Quasi War and the
Tripolitan War the navy was the only force that was able to defend American
interests. With those lessons learned,
the navy was able to build to what is now the most powerful naval force in the
w
[1]
Karen Parrish, “DOD
Leaders: U.S. Will Remain World’s
Strongest Navy,” American Forces Press
Service,
January 8, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66711.
[2]
Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 15.
[3]
“The Birth of the Navy of the
United States,” Naval History & Heritage Command, accessed November 20,
2014,
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq31-1.htm.
[4] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO,
LLC, 2010), 1.
[5] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO,
LLC, 2010), 1-2.
[6] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 11-12.
[7] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 11-12.
[8] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO,
LLC, 2010), 5.
[9] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO,
LLC, 2010), 4.
[10] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865: Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln,
NE:
University of Nebraska, 2012), 28.
[11] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2007), 47.
[12] Ibid, 47.
[13]Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House,
1991), 13.
[14] Ibid, 16.
[15] Volo, Blue Water Patriot, 46.
[16] R. Blake Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare: The U.S. Navy in Riverine Warfare and the
Emergence of a Tactical
Doctrine, 1775-1970 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 11-12.
[17] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2007), 54-55.
[18] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2007), 53.
[19]
“The Continental Navy,” The
Order of the Founders and Patriots of America, accessed November 23, 2014,
http://www.founderspatriots.org/articles/continental_navy.php.
[20] Nathan Miller, Broadsides:
The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775-1815 (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2005), 19.
[21] Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New
York: The Free Press, 1991),
2.
[22] R. Blake Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare: The U.S. Navy in Riverine Warfare and the
Emergence of a Tactical
Doctrine, 1775-1970 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 5-6.
[23] “Captain John Paul Jones,” The
American Revolution.org, accessed November 22, 2014,
http://www.theamericanrevolution.org/PeopleDetail.aspx?people=16.
[24] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 24.
[25] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2007), 49.
[26] Ibid, 218.
[27] Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New
York: The Free Press, 1991),
11.
[28] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House,
1991), 37-38.
[29] Ibid, 37-38.
[30] Ibid, 38.
[31] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2007), 218.
[32] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2007), 219.
[33] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House,
1991), 39.
[34] Ibid, 39.
[35] Ibid, 39.
[36] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House,
1991), 41.
[37]
Todd Andrlik, ed., Reporting the Revolutionary War: Before it was History, it was News (Naperville,
IL:
Sourcebooks Inc, 2012), 266-267.
[38] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 16.
[39] Howarth, To Shining Sea, 45.
[40] Fredriksen, The United States Navy, 16-18.
[41] Ibid, 18.
[42] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 33.
[43] Ibid, 34.
[44] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 36.
[45] Ibid, 37.
[46] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 20.
[47] Miller, The US Navy, 38-39.
[48] Fredriksen, The United States Navy, 21.
[49] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865: Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln,
NE:
University of Nebraska, 2012), 42-43.
[50] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 39-40.
[51] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:
A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1997), 44.
[52] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 27.
[53] Ibid, 28.
[54] Ibid, 29.
[55] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House,
1991), 71.
[56] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy: 1775-1991 (New York: Random House,
1991), 72-76.
[57] Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History
of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York:
W.W. Norton &
Company, 2006), 189-91.
[58] Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History
of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York:
W.W. Norton &
Company, 2006), 192-210.
[59] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 33.
[60] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 33.
[61] Ibid, 34-35.
[62] Donald. R. Hickey, ed., The War of 1812: Writings from America’s Second War of
Independence (New York:
Literary Classics of the United States Inc, 2013),
xxii.
[63] N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New
York: W. W. Norton
& Company, 2004), 567.
[64] Nathan Miller, Broadsides:
The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775-1815 (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2005), 338.
[65] Ibid, 338.
[66] Ibid, 339.
[67]
Captain Dacres to Vice
Admiral Sawyer, September 7, 1812, in British
Public Record Office, Admiralty 1/502,
Part 4, 541-45.
[68] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 40-41.
[69]
Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 (Echo Library), 3rd
ed., (Middlesex, United Kingdom: The
Echo
Library, 2007), 140.
[70] Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New
York: The Free Press, 1991),
85-86.
[71] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 40-41.
[72] Hagan, This People’s Navy, 86.
[73] George Daughan, If By Sea:
The Forging of the American Navy – From the Revolution to the War of
1812 (New
York: Perseus
Books Group, 2008), 414.
[74] Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial
Edition (Chicago: University of
Illinois, 2012), 96.
[75]
Ibid, 99.
[76] Ibid, 99.
[77] Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial
Edition (Chicago: University of
Illinois, 2012), 151-153.
[78] N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New
York: W. W. Norton
& Company, 2004), 570-572.
[79] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy: A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, LLC, 2010), 45.
[80] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865: Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln,
NE:
University of Nebraska, 2012), 83.
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