The Reluctant Navy: History of the US Navy, 1775-1815

The Reluctant Navy:  History of the US Navy, 1775-1815

The United States Navy is the strongest navy in the world.[1]  Its origin and that of its lineal predecessor, the Continental Navy, were far from certain.  “For no nation was ever less willing to create a navy.”[2]  The debate raged in Congress for ten days.  Most southern delegates felt that a navy would only benefit the north while still others felt that if they formed a navy that it would bring the wrath of the British Navy down upon them.  Still others felt that the construction of a navy would be detrimental to reconciliation with the British.  Pro-naval representatives led by John Adams prevailed.  On October 13, 1775 the Continental Congress voted to construct two sailing vessels with ten carriage guns and swivel guns.  These vessels were to be manned by eighty sailors and to send them on a three month cruise to intercept British shipping of war materials to the British army in America.  It was this legislation that served as the birth certificate of the Continental Navy.[3]  Even after the birth of the navy it took several armed conflicts beginning with the American Revolution and ending with the War of 1812 before the United States learned the importance of maintaining a reliable navy.

            The formation of the Continental Navy was not the first significant naval action.  That honor goes to Captain James Mugford.  On May 17, 1775, Mugford, of the sloop Franklin, captured the transport HMS Hope and its cargo of “…1,000 barrels of gunpowder and a like number of muskets…” while off the coast of Boston. [4]  Then Colonel Benedict Arnold on May 18, 1775 captured the English sloop Betsy on Lake Champlain, which he renames Enterprise.  By October 13, 1775 at least ten similar actions had occurred.[5]  The fact that naval action had already been taken made it easy for the Continental Congress to vote for the creation of a navy.  On November 2, 1775, the Continental Congress voted to spend $100,000 to buy, arm, and rename eight merchant vessels:  Alfred (24), Columbus (18), Andrew Doria (14), Cabot (14), Providence (12), Hornet (10), and Fly (8).  Then on November 10, 1775, the Continental Congress passed a resolution to raise two battalions of marines to act as landing forces for the newly formed fleet.

            On February 18, 1776, Esek Hopkins led the Continental Navy’s first sortie in strength against the British.  His orders from congress were to sail to the Chesapeake Bay to deal with a small fleet lead by Lord Dunmore, the former Royal governor of Virginia, who had caused difficulty in the area. Hopkins, however, chose to pursue another mission.  He set sail for New Providence, Bahamas where there was a large stockpile of military provisions.  Hopkins’s fleet consisted of his flagship:  the Alfred (24), Columbus (24), Andrew Doria (14), Cabot (14), Providence (12), Hornet (10), Wasp (8), and Fly (8).  The second night, February 19, 1776, the fleet encountered a severe gale where during the heavy weather the Fly and Hornet collided and lagged far behind the rest of the fleet.  Hopkins proceeded to Great Abaco Island where he waited in vain for two days for the two stricken ships.  Then on March 3, 1776, while at Great Abaco, Hopkins took two island sloops.  He had planned to man with 200 marines and fifty sailors and have the two ships sail into the port and surprise the unsuspecting British.  However, Hopkins was not aware he had allowed his ships to rise above the horizon, thereby losing the element of surprise.[6] 

            He diverted the sloops to the far end of the island where the Continental Navy made its first amphibious landing.  After an overland march, the marines were able to take the British garrison, along with eighty-eight cannons, fifteen mortars, and a small portion of gunpowder.  However, because of Hopkins’s careless approach, the British were able to move 150 casks of gunpowder out of reach of the attacking Continentals.  Despite the misfortune that had, thus far, hampered the mission, Hopkins was able to capture a good deal of military material that the Continental Army could make good use.  It took two weeks for the Continentals to get their booty loaded aboard their ships.  On March 17, 1776, Commodore Hopkins set sail for Philadelphia; however, as the heavily laden fleet sail for their home port there was an outbreak of small pox.  The crew of the Wasp was especially hit hard and lagged behind after encountering bad weather off the coast of Georgia.  On April 6, 1776 the remaining ships of the Continental fleet came upon the frigate HMS Glasgow (20) which should have been easy prey for the Continental fleet; however, the Glasgow was able to escape while inflicting damage on the Continentals.  During the four-hour battle, Hopkins issued no orders other than to recall the other ships.[7]

            During the engagement, the Alfred’s steering was severely damaged.  Two days later, Hopkins’ fleet limped into port at New London, Connecticut ending the squadron’s only sortie.  The squadron was never reconstituted due to a lack of manpower because the majority of able bodied sailors preferred to sail on better paying privateers.[8] 

            On March 19, 1775 Samuel Chase entered a motion that the Continental Navy be able to target British shipping.  The motion was ultimately tabled.  On March 23, 1776 the Continental Congress passed a resolution that would allow for privateering against British shipping by issuing letters of marque.[9]  In all, 2,000 privateers were commissioned by the Continental Congress or individual states, which accounted for more than 2,200 captured British merchant ships.[10]  When compared to the Continental Navy that captured fewer than 200 ships.[11]  Privateers proved to be a double-edged sword.  While privateers captured British shipping that provided much-needed supplies to the war effort.  In addition, Benjamin Franklin also offered a high bounty to privateers for British seaman so that they may be exchanged for captured Continental seaman.[12]  However, privateers were only on the fringes of the war effort and kept to sea only when profitable to the privateer.  The privateer also proved detrimental to the Continental Navy in that it drew away already limited personnel resources.[13]  Though privateers had a noticeable effect on shipping costs, the insurance went from three percent of total combined cargo value to twenty-seven percent and freight rates jumped from nine shillings a ton to thirteen shillings.  Though this may have added to the unpopularity of the war in Britain, it was not enough to end the war and was not even enough to stop the flow of goods from England to North America and the Caribbean.[14]  Continental privateers operated on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in the Caribbean.[15]  However, most privateers stayed close to home.  Some of the favored hunting grounds of the privateers were the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and the West Indies, though they were far from the only locations where privateers were found.

            Privateers were not the only force that competed with the Continental Navy for men.  Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, Maryland, Georgia, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island all fielded navies.[16]  The size and makeup of each state’s navy varied though most states believed ships ranging between eighteen to twenty guns were the optimal balance between speed and firepower.  Though based on the performance of the state’s navies, this seemed to be a very optimistic position based on the amount of success the state navies attained.  Though the states’ navies tended to have a handful of ships suitable for operations at sea.  The vast majority of state navies were made up of row galleys, whale boats, and other small craft more suited for river and coastal defense. 

The exception to this was the navy of South Carolina, which fielded a navy that had the largest ships that served on the Continental side.  The frigate South Carolina armed with twenty-eight 36-pounders and twelve 12-pounders although initially rated at forty guns.  The South Carolina entered the war in 1781.  Its initial cruise was in the North Sea.  It next appeared in the Caribbean as part of a large combined fleet of Spanish and Continental ships in an attack on Nassau, Bahamas.  On December 20, 1782, the South Carolina was taken off the Delaware Cape by the Dromede (44), Astra (32), and Quebec (32).[17]

In New England, the largest ship fielded by a state navy was the Massachusetts frigate Protector (28), which saw service in the Massachusetts state navy until May 1781.  On her first cruise in 1779, the Protector engaged the loyalist privateer Admiral Duff (32) and after a long hard fight that left both ships severely damaged, the Admiral Duff sank.  Soon after the battle, the Protector encountered the HMS Thames (32).  Given the Protector’s state of disrepair, she, fortunately, was able to allude capture.  However, in May 1781 the Protector was captured by the HMS Roebuck (44) and the HMS Medea (24).  The Protector was taken into the Royal Navy where she was renamed the HMS Hussar (28) and served until 1783.[18]

            Though the most important colonial naval force was the Continental Army.  George Washington, acting entirely on his authority, acquired eight small vessels in 1775 and 1776.  The first ship was the Hannah, lightly armed with just four 4-pounders.  He also acquired the Lynch, the Franklin, the Lee, the Warren, the Harrison, and the Hancock.[19]  In total “Washington’s fleet” captured fifty-five enemy craft including four troop transports carrying a total of 300 British soldiers.  The most important single ship-to-ship engagement between the Continentals and the British occurred on November 27, 1775 when Washington’s schooner Lee, captained by John Manley, captured the British ordinance brig HMS Nancy, which was loaded with 2,000 muskets with bayonets, 31 tons of musket balls, 30,000 round shot of various weights, 100,000 musket flints, and a 13 inch mortar.  So pleased was Washington with the prize he stated “…[gave] new life to our camp...”[20]  While the Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, saw the capture of the Nancy as “a fatal event.”[21]

            As important as “Washington’s Fleet” was because of its victories, another Continental general’s “fleet” was perhaps even more important in defeat.  During 1776, Benedict Arnold worked to secure Lake Champlain and the surrounding water ways to insure that New England would not be cut off from the rest of the colonies by the British.  Governor General Guy Carelton attempted to do this on October 11, 1776 when he sent a force of thirty-four ships against Arnold’s twenty-three.  The two forces met at about eleven o’clock in the morning, and the battle raged until about six o’clock in the evening and the British withdrew early on October 12, 1776.  Arnold decided to make for Fort Crown Point on October 13, 1776.  The British were able to overtake Arnold and after another five hours of battle, Arnold’s fleet was reduced to four gondolas which Arnold beached in a small creek and put to the torch.  He and his remaining men made for Fort Crown Point over land though Arnold’s fleet was lost to the British.  The fact that the British had to build a fleet to deal with Arnold’s delayed Carleton’s advance out of Canada too long into the campaigning season.  He was forced to halt his advance until the spring of 1777, turning Arnold’s tactical defeat into a strategic victory.[22] 

            Though the Continental Navy faced obstacles that would prove overwhelming, it was the proving ground for the man that credited with being the “father” of the United States Navy, John Paul Jones.  He was born John Paul in 1747 in Kirkcudbrightshire, Scotland.  He went to sea at an early age (thirteen years old), and by the age of twenty-one, Jones had become a merchant ship captain.[23]  He then secured a commission in the Continental Navy as First Lieutenant of the Alfred[24] where he was responsible for raising the first “national” flag to fly over a Continental Navy vessel.[25]  Jones served well on the Alfred and was rewarded with the command of the Providence (12).  While in command of the Providence, Jones in short order captured sixteen prizes.  This cemented Jones’s reputation.[26]  Then in March of 1777, the Marine committee gave Jones command of the sloop of war Ranger (18), which was still under construction. 

On November 1, 1777, Jones set sail to Europe carrying news of General John Burgoyne’s surrender of 5,700 troops at Saratoga.  This information led to the French coming into the war on the side of the colonists.  This gave the colonists a base to strike at England in its home waters.[27]  On April 10, 1778, Jones set sail for British waters where he captured two prizes while sinking two others.  He then raided the village of White Haven though to little avail.  Then Jones took the ranger to St. Mary’s Isle, the home of the Lord of Selkirk.  Jones planned to capture the Lord and trade him for colonial prisoners.  This plan failed when Selkirk proved to be away.  The next day, April 24, 1778, Jones encountered the British sloop of war Drake.  The two well-matched ships dueled for over an hour during which the captain of the Drake was killed while the British sloop was forced to surrender.  After the encounter with the Drake, Jones returned to France.[28]  Though the strategic value of Jones’s raid was not great, the raids did not go unnoticed in England where the public soon began putting pressure on the government for more protection.[29]

Ten months later all of the prisoners taken by Jones as well as some taken by the French were exchanged for colonial prisoners.  It is the first time that there was a successful exchange between the colonials and the British.[30]  While Jones was successful at sea, he was not popular among his men.  Upon his return to France, seventy-seven sailors and twenty-eight warrant and petty officers complained to the commissioners in Paris that Jones was arbitrary, bad tempered, and insufferable.  This led to the ranger and its crew returning to America.[31]  Jones remained in France where Benjamin Franklin promised Jones a new frigate.  This frigate never materialized; however, in late 1778 the Colonial Navy purchased a Dutch merchantman named Duc de Duras.  The ship which Jones renamed the Bonhomme Richard.   The Bonhomme Richard was rated for forty guns; however, it was armed with six 9-pounders on its upper deck, twenty-eight 12-pounders on its main deck, and six ancient 18-pounders mounted so low on the ship that they could only be rolled out in a flat calm.  Jones is also allowed to choose his crew of 380, most of whom were British deserters and released prisoners of war.[32]

On August 14, 1779, Jones in the Bonhomme Richard led a squadron made up of two privateers, three French navy vessels, and one other Continental Navy vessel.  Soon after the fleet sailed, each captain began acting on their accord.  Then on September 23, 1779 off Flamborough Head, Jones’ Flotilla came upon a convoy of ships escorted by two British warships, the Countess of Scarborough (22) and the Serapis (44).  The Pallas (32) engaged the Countess of Scarborough while Jones in Bonhomme Richard engaged the Serapis, which initiated three hours of the hardest fighting ever seen under sail.[33]  The battle began just after sunset with the two ships sailing parallel to each other exchanging broadsides with each ship attempting to pass astern of the other to gain an advantage.  The two ships were so close that their rigging became entangled.  The captain of the Serapis, Richard Pearson, then asked Jones “Has your ship struck?”[34]  Jones replied, “I have not yet begun to fight!”[35]  The ships broke away from each other and exchanged broadsides only to become once again entangled in each other’s rigging while still firing at each other for two hours.  By this time, Jones had lost all his guns but three 9-pounders.  Though sharp shooters in the Bonhome Richard were able to sweep the Serapis’s upper decks while Jones instructed his gunners on his remaining cannon to target the mast of the Serapis.  About this time, the Serapis was rocked by a major explosion as a sailor aloft in the Bonhome Richard’s rigging was able to lob a grenade among neglected powder charges left on the deck of the Serapis.  By 10:30 p.m. Pearson had struck his colors.  Shortly after he did, Serapis’s main mast fell, though Pearson had surrendered.  The Bonhomme Richard was taking on water, and Jones was forced to transfer his flag to the Serapis, while his crew valiantly tried to save their ship but to no avail.  At about ten o’clock in the morning on September 24, 1779, the Bonhomme Richard slipped below the surface. 

The battle off Flamborough Head was the high water mark for the Continental Navy during the Revolutionary War.[36]  The Birmingham Gazette stated, “I doubt not but you have heard of the alarming Situation we have been in since Tuesday night; but thank God, as yet we have been only terrified by this Paul Jones.”[37]  The last time Jones served in battle for the Continental Navy; he was the captain of the fourteen gun sloop Ariel, and he captured the British privateer Triumph off the West Indies on December 14, 1780.[38]

In 1778, France declared war on Britain.  In 1779, they were joined by the Spanish and in 1780 the Dutch.  That same year the rest of Europe formed the (Anti-British) League of Neutrality.  The American Revolution had become a war that stretched around the world.[39]  By this time, the naval war had become largely war by proxy for the Continentals.[40]  By April 11, 1783 the Continental Congress declares the Revolutionary War at an end.[41]

The new country of the United States of America found itself weak and in debt which exacerbated the situation.  In order to raise much-needed capital all but one frigate, the Alliance, had been sold off.  Then on August 1, 1785, the Alliance was sold at auction for $26,000 and with that the Continental Navy ceased to exist.[42]  For four years, the United States was a country without a navy.  During this time, American trade in the Mediterranean was targeted by pirates operating in the Barbary States of Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli.  They realized that American shipping was no longer protected by the Royal Navy and that the United States did not have a navy of its own.  The Articles of Confederation, in fact, did not specifically give the right to maintain a navy; however, in Article IX it does give Congress the power to issue letters of marque.  This weak document and the lack of funds in concert with the same sectional rivalries that had hindered the formation of the Continental Navy conspired against the formation of a naval force.[43]

In 1789, the United States ratified a new constitution that specifically authorized Congress “to provide and maintain a navy”.  It would be another conflict, the French Revolution in 1793, which expedited the founding of the United States Navy.  When a truce between Portugal and Algiers, negotiated by the British, ended Portugal’s blockade of Gibraltar which allowed the Barbary pirates to come out into the Atlantic where they promptly captured eleven American ships in the first two months following the end of the blockade.  The British position on the removal of the blockade was that Portugal, their ally, could put their ships to other uses.  Many Americans saw it as an attack on American commerce.  On January 2, 1794, the House of Representatives approved a resolution to create a naval force adequate to protect the commerce of the United States.  It passed by just two votes with northern and tidewater representatives voting for the proposition and southern and inland members voting against the resolution.  The exception was a few South Carolinians who represented mercantile interests.[44]  Opponents of the resolution claimed it would only serve to embroil the United States in foreign affairs and would endanger the liberties of the people.  While proponents countered that a navy would be able to act not only to protect commerce but to ensure our neutrality and that it operated overseas.  The navy could scarcely be an instrument of domestic tyranny.  Finally approved on March 27, 1794, the Navy Act authorized the procurement of six frigates:  four 44-gun and two 36-gun.  However, as a provision in the act if peace terms were concluded between the Dey of Algiers and the United States, work on the ships were to be summarily halted.[45]

In conjunction with the Naval Act of 1794, George Washington appointed the first six naval officers of the United States Navy:  John Berry, Richard Dale, Samuel Nicholson, Silas Talbot, Joshua Barney, and Thomas Truxtun.[46]  Shortly after the Navy Act passed, Congress authorized the expenditure of $800,000 to obtain a treaty with the Algerians.  Unfortunately for the supporters of the Navy in September 1795, a treaty was signed with the Dey of Algiers, which meant all work on the frigates was to come to a halt.  President Washington strongly opposed this on the grounds it would be wasteful.  After much debate in Congress, a compromise was finally reached allowing for the completion of two 44-gun frigates, the Constitution and the United States, and one 36-gun frigate, the Constellation.[47]  That same year in his last annual address to Congress, George Washington again endorsed the creation of a navy for the protection of American commerce and the national reputation.[48]

On July 11, 1797, the forty-four gun frigate United States was formally commissioned as the first warship of the United States Navy.  John Barry, veteran of the Revolutionary War, was named captain.  In September of 1797, the Constellation (36) and the following month the Constitution (44) was launched. 

These ships would soon be put to the test.  Due to the growing tensions between the United States and the new Republic of France over what appeared, to the French, as improving relations between the British and the United States failure to continue payment of debt incurred by the United States during the Revolutionary War.  In 1796, the French government recalled its minister and announced it would seek satisfaction against American shipping.  During the winter of 1796, French privateers captured several hundred American ships.  This issue was brought to a head in 1797 when President John Adams revealed the details of failed negotiations with the French government, historically known as the XYZ Affair.  This led Congress to direct the fledgling United States Navy to undertake active operations and in 1798, Congress also authorized the purchase or construction of additional warships. 

However, there were not enough votes to declare war on France but on July 7, 1797 Congress voted to rescind its treaties with France.[49]  The so-called Quasi-War had begun.  That same day near Great Egg Harbor, New Jersey, Captain Stephen Decatur of the sloop Delaware (20) captured the French privateer La Croyable (14).  In 1798, the President was empowered to purchase an additional two dozen warships armed with between eighteen to thirty-two guns.  Eight small cutters belonging to the forerunner of the Coast Guard were also added to the navy.  The navy was also supplemented by warships that were paid for by patriotic citizens in many sea ports who purchased what amounted to the first United States war bonds.  The Essex, Philadelphia, and Boston were among ships paid for in this manner.[50]  By the end of 1798, the United States Navy had cleared the French from North American waters.  The French had retreated to the Caribbean.  Somewhat ironically the United States Navy was aided by the Royal Navy’s blockade of French ports.  This kept most of France’s larger warships on the far side of the Atlantic leaving only a handful of frigates and smaller vessels as well as a swarm of privateers, a force that was on equal footing with the United States Navy.

On April 30, 1798, President Adams appointed Benjamin Stoddert as the first Secretary of the Navy.  Stoddert felt the navy’s strength would be most effective if the fleet were organized into units ranging from three to ten ships.  Though this was not always the case.  An example of this occurred in February 1799, when the Constellation (36) engaged the forty gun frigate L’Insurgente, which was reputed to be the fastest ship in the French Navy.  The Constellation, which was captained by Thomas Truxtun, was able to swing across the bow of the L’Insurgente pouring murderous fire into the hull of the enemy vessel at close range.  The battle raged for about an hour and a half and left the L’Insurgente a battered wreck. 

The Constellation was also involved in another noteworthy battle which occurred on February 1, 1800.  When the Constellation came upon the fifty-four gun French frigate La Vengence, which led the Constellation on a day-long chase but eventually the two vessels were within a pistol shot of each other.  The battle raged for the next five hours and shortly before one o’clock in the morning the French ship’s guns fell silent.  Believing they had struck, the Constellation slid alongside.  It was at this time that Truxtun discovered that the Constellation’s main mast was unsupported by rigging and despite all attempts the Constellation’s crew was unable to save the mast.  In the confusion, the La Vengence limped off under the cover of darkness but before the La Vengence could make port in Curacao, it too lost her mainmast as well as her fore and mizzen top masts.  The captain described the Constellation as a two deck ship of the line.[51] 

The year 1800 proved to be very productive for the young United States Navy.  It captured forty-nine French privateers and the frigate La Berceau without losing one United States vessel.[52]  By February 3, 1800, the Quasi-War had come to an end.  The United States Navy had acquitted themselves well, with the United States sixteen warships capturing eighty-five French privateers and two frigates while only losing one sloop.  The end of the Quasi War also brought about a reduction of an already small navy.  On February 18, 1801, Stoddert resigned, and five months would pass before a replacement was named.  On March 3, 1801 President Adams signed the Peace Establishment Act which authorized the retention of thirteen warships for the United States Navy but only six of these ships were to remain on active duty.  The act also reduced the officer corp.  Though the “peace” was short lived.[53]

The Barbary States remained an area of contention for the United States.  Throughout the remainder of 1801, the United States Navy and Barbary vessels skirmished.[54]  On February 6, 1802, Congress voted to lift all the restrictions imposed by the Peace Establishment Act.   Then on May 15, 1802 the Pasha of Tripoli declares war on the United States.[55]  During 1802, the navy was largely ineffective primarily because the draft of the American ships was too great to come close to the cities.  To remedy this situation, funds were acquired for four shallow draft vessels.  The brigs, Siren and Argus, each carried two 12-pound cannons that would be used for ship-to-ship fighting and sixteen 24-pound carronades designed for shore bombardments.  The schooners, Nautilus and Vixen, also carried two 12-pound cannons and twelve 18-pound carronades, with the frigates able to patrol offshore and the new shallow draft vessels patrolling close to shore. 

On June 21, 1803 Edward Preble in the Constitution took command of the Mediterranean fleet.  A very able seaman and strict disciplinarian which made him unpopular with his officers at first but as the cruise continued his junior officer’s minds began to change.[56]  On October 3, 1803, Preble arrived in Malta and met up with Captain William Bainbridge of the frigate Philadelphia and gave him orders to leave for Tripoli at once along with the Vixen to blockade the city, which he did. 

On October 31, 1803, Bainbridge and the Philadelphia were on station off Tripoli when a ship was sighted trying to run the blockade.  Bainbridge began to give chase and for more than three hours the chase continued.  Logs show that during the chase, Bainbridge was constantly casting the lead and reporting depths between seven to ten fathoms.  As the Philadelphia came to the mouth of the harbor, Bainbridge called off the chase and turned into the wind.  Though, unfortunately, as he made the turn the ship lurched to a stop.  The ship had run aground.  Bainbridge immediately attempted to remove the stricken ship to no avail.  The Tripolitans could see the distressed ship and made for their boats to capture the unexpected prize.[57]

Preble learned of the loss on November 24, 1803 from the HMS Amazon.  Preble at once sailed for Malta and upon his arrival sent a crew ashore.  They soon returned with correspondence from Bainbridge that not only confirmed the capture of the Philadelphia but that the Tripolatins had floated her and had begun to refit her.  Upon hearing this, Preble sailed for Sicily where he had set a rendezvous with the Enterprise and Nautilus and the supply ship Traveler.  The night before Christmas Eve, the Constitution was on station near Tripoli with the Enterprise when soon after first light lookouts reported a ship on the horizon.  Preble ordered the British ensign sent aloft and gave chase and caught the Tripolitan ketch Mastico and sent it to Sicily with the Enterprise as an escort.   On Christmas Day 1803, a storm blew the Constitution off station and battered the ship for several days.  Preble was forced to return to Sicily where the ketch is renamed Intrepid and refitted for a mission to destroy the captured Philadelphia.

The Intrepid and the Siren sailed for Tripoli on February 3, 1804 and by the seventh the two ships were off Tripoli but weather conditions prevented the Intrepid from entering the harbor.  Then finally on February 16, 1804 Stephen Decatur Junior, in command of the Intrepid, gave the go ahead to the mission.  Decatur came alongside the Philadelphia before they are seen by the Tripolitans on board the captured ship.  After a short but savage fight the Americans prevail, and Decatur was able to fire the Philadelphia and escape without incident.[58] 

Throughout the rest of 1804, Commodore Preble continued to press the Pasha of Tripoli aggressively, shelling the city ten times between August 3, 1804 and September 2, 1804.  A week later Commodore Preble is relieved by Commodore Samuel Baron, who is relieved by Commodore John Rogers on May 22, 1805, neither of who were as aggressive as Commodore Preble.  By June 3, 1805 agreement is reached ending the war.  The United States agreed to pay $60,000 for the release of all prisoners, and Tripoli waived any claims to future tribute.  The next day Captain Bainbridge and the rest of the Philadelphia crew were freed.[59]  With the end of the Tripolitan War, the young United States Navy again acquitted itself well.  However, more importantly the Tripolitan War served as a finishing school for many young officers and perhaps more importantly, unlike after the Quasi War, the officer corp was reduced but it was not decimated.  Congress authorized 13 captains, 9 master commandants, and 925 sailors.[60]

Beginning in 1806, the young United States Navy’s main source of conflict is the British Navy with a handful of issues, most of which concerned the impressment of American seaman.  The two most serious of these events occurred on June 22, 1807 when the HMS Leopard fired upon the USS Chesapeake after it refused to allow the British to come aboard to search for deserters.  Then on May 16, 1811 off the New Jersey coast the USS President encountered an unidentified vessel and broadsides are exchanged before the ship is identified as the HMS Little Belt.  This action acts as a prelude to the War of 1812.[61]

The War of 1812 occurred primarily for reasons tied to maritime trade and American sovereignty on the open seas.  Whether the issue of impressment of American sailors, the looting of American shipping, or the British regulations known as the orders-in-council that sharply curtailed United States trade in Europe.  These actions were referred to by President James Madison in an address to Congress on November 5, 1811 when he spoke of Britain’s “hostile inflexibility”.[62]  On June 18, 1812 Congress declared war pitting the 17 warships of the United States Navy against the 1,048 warships of the Royal Navy.  The Americans main line of defense was its original six frigates, while the British had the largest fleet in the world.    

The American Navy enjoyed numerous successes in 1812 and the first half of 1813.  The greatest success came when the United States frigate Constitution (44) defeated the British frigate HMS Guerriere (31) on August 19, 1812.[63]  Over the past twenty years, the British had fought 200 single-ship engagements and had only lost five.  So Captain Dacres unhesitatingly offered battle to the American frigate that he encountered off the coast of Newfoundland.  For forty-five minutes, the two ships maneuvered until at six o’clock in the evening.  Captain Isaac Hull gave the order to fire sending double shot into the Guerriere within fifteen minutes of fighting, the Guerriere’s mizzen mast had been shot away, her sides riddled, and sail and rigging shredded.  A sailor on board the Constitution is reported to see British shot bounced off the side of the Constitution.  It is reported he exclaimed, “Her sides are made of iron!”[64]  Hull then pulled ahead of the British vessel and crossed her bow where Hull raked her with two broadsides, soon after the Guerriere’s foremast fell taking the main mast with it.  At this time, Hull ordered his men to cease fire and sent an officer to inquire if Dacres had struck his colors.  Dacres replied, “I don’t know.  Our mizzenmast is gone, our mainmast is gone; an upon the whole, you may say we have struck our flag.”[65]  The loss of the Guerriere was a major shock in Britain.  Then in London The Times said the news “spread a degree of gloom through the town, which it was painful to observe.”[66]  Captain Dacres in a letter wrote,

…I hope, in considering the circumstances, you will think the Ship entrusted to my charge was properly defended; the unfortunate loss of our Masts, the absence of the third lieutenant, second Lieutenant of Marines, three Midshipmen, and twenty four Men considerably weakened our Crew, and we only muster’d at Quarters 244 Men and 19 Boys, on coming into action; the Enemy had such an advantage from his Marines and Riflemen, when close and his superior sailing enabled him to choose his distance.[67]

 

The open seas were not the only place that the navy won important battles.  Important battles were also won on the Great Lakes.  The best known of these battles being between Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry’s squadron on Lake Erie and his British counterpart Commodore Robert Barclay.[68]  On September 10, 1813 Perry and Barclay met.  Perry bore down on Barclay from Windward under a banner that read “Don’t give up the ship” onboard his flagship the Lawrence.  Perry fought until the vessel lay dead in the water, and only 19 of his 142 man crew remained fit to fight.  Perry’s second-in-command, Jesse Elliott, who had inexplicably kept his ship the Niagara well clear of the vicious two-hour fight, now cautiously approached the Lawrence.  Perry, under fire, had himself rowed to the Niagara and took command and ordered Elliott to be rowed to the now battered Lawrence.  Perry in his new flagship managed to “cross the T” on the British line.  From this position, Perry was able to lay down a withering barrage of raking fire.  By three o’clock in the afternoon on September 10, 1813 Barclay had surrendered, and for the first time in history a British commander surrendered an entire squadron.  “The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its material results and in its moral effect.”[69]  This victory made the British position in Michigan and Ohio untenable.[70]  Then later that month Perry transported General William H. Harrison’s 4,500 men to the Canada shore where they promptly retook Detroit and pursued the British to the Thames River.[71]  After the battle, Perry was promoted to Captain and Congress voted $250,000 in prize money for Perry and his men.  This was put into perspective when Hull and the crew of the Constitution had only received $50,000 for its victory over the Guerriere.[72]

As in the Revolutionary War a major part of the naval strategy called for the use of privateers to disrupt British shipping and the Americans putout over 526 privately owned armed vessels.  These vessels did not only affect the supply of British in North America but also in Europe.[73]  One of the most successful privateers was the fifteen-gun Yankee owned by James DeWolf from Bristol, Rhode Island.  It was responsible for eight vessels taken worth $300,000 while the Rossie (15), commanded by Joshua Barney of Baltimore, captured eighteen vessels worth about $1.5 million.[74]  In the first six months of the war, American privateers captured 450 British ships. 

During the first year of the war, both sides’ expectations were not met.  For the Americans taking Canada, was supposed to be a “mere matter of marching”, had proved extremely illusive.  While at sea where the Royal Navy was thought to be invincible, the war had gone very well for the Americans small navy.  In Britain the Admiralty ordered British frigates not, “to engage, single handed, the larger Class of American ships; which though they may be called Frigates…[resemble] Line of Battle Ships.”[75]  The British government also ordered all merchantmen in the Atlantic to sail in convoy.[76]  Unfortunately for the American Navy this was its high watermark in the conflict.

By July 1813, Britain had increased its naval presence in North America to 129 including ten ships of the line.  With this increase in ships, the British were able to do what they never had done during the Revolutionary War; blockade the entire Atlantic Coast.[77]  After the summer of 1813, the navy’s opportunities were few and far in between.  The only American warship of any size at sea was the Essex, and it was all the way in the Pacific harassing British whaling.  Only small warships were able to slip past the blockade, and that became less frequent as the year went by.

By 1814, only the United States was left to draw the ire of Britain with Napoleon defeated.[78]  The British were ready for peace and on December 24, 1814 delegates from Britain and the United States met in Ghent, Belgium and signed a peace treaty ending the War of 1812.  Though there were battles still fought for the next two months they were of no consequence as the treaty of Ghent was ratified by the United States Senate on February 17, 1815.[79]

With the end of the War of 1812 there was little time for peace for the Barbary States was again preying on neutral shipping and in February 1815 the United States declared war on Algiers.[80]  From the time of the revolution to the end of the War of 1812, the United States learned an important lesson on the need for a navy.  At the start of the War of 1812, the navy was the only prepared branch of the military.  While during both the Quasi War and the Tripolitan War the navy was the only force that was able to defend American interests.  With those lessons learned, the navy was able to build to what is now the most powerful naval force in the w

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[1] Karen Parrish, “DOD Leaders:  U.S. Will Remain World’s Strongest Navy,” American Forces Press Service,

January 8, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66711.

[2] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 15.

[3] “The Birth of the Navy of the United States,” Naval History & Heritage Command, accessed November 20, 2014,

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq31-1.htm.

[4] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-CLIO,

LLC, 2010), 1.

[5] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-CLIO,

LLC, 2010), 1-2.

[6] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 11-12.

[7] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 11-12.

[8] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-CLIO,

LLC, 2010), 5.

[9] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-CLIO,

LLC, 2010), 4.

[10] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865:  Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln, NE: 

University of Nebraska, 2012), 28.

[11] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots:  The American Revolution Afloat (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2007), 47.

[12] Ibid, 47.

[13]Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy:  1775-1991 (New York:  Random House,

1991), 13.

[14] Ibid, 16.

[15] Volo, Blue Water Patriot, 46.

[16] R. Blake Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare:  The U.S. Navy in Riverine Warfare and the Emergence of a Tactical

Doctrine, 1775-1970 (Gainesville, FL:  University Press of Florida, 2003), 11-12.

[17] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots:  The American Revolution Afloat (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2007), 54-55.

[18] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots:  The American Revolution Afloat (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2007), 53.

[19] “The Continental Navy,” The Order of the Founders and Patriots of America, accessed November 23, 2014,

http://www.founderspatriots.org/articles/continental_navy.php.

[20] Nathan Miller, Broadsides:  The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775-1815 (Edison, NJ:  Castle Books, 2005), 19.

[21] Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy:  The Making of American Sea Power (New York:  The Free Press, 1991),

2.

[22] R. Blake Dunnavent, Brown Water Warfare:  The U.S. Navy in Riverine Warfare and the Emergence of a Tactical

Doctrine, 1775-1970 (Gainesville, FL:  University Press of Florida, 2003), 5-6.

[23] “Captain John Paul Jones,” The American Revolution.org, accessed November 22, 2014,

http://www.theamericanrevolution.org/PeopleDetail.aspx?people=16.

[24] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 24.

[25] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots:  The American Revolution Afloat (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2007), 49.

[26] Ibid, 218.

[27] Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy:  The Making of American Sea Power (New York:  The Free Press, 1991),

11.

[28] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy:  1775-1991 (New York:  Random House,

1991), 37-38.

[29] Ibid, 37-38.

[30] Ibid, 38.

[31] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots:  The American Revolution Afloat (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2007), 218.

[32] James M. Volo, Blue Water Patriots:  The American Revolution Afloat (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2007), 219.

[33] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy:  1775-1991 (New York:  Random House,

1991), 39.

[34] Ibid, 39.

[35] Ibid, 39.

[36] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy:  1775-1991 (New York:  Random House,

1991), 41.

[37] Todd Andrlik, ed., Reporting the Revolutionary War:  Before it was History, it was News (Naperville, IL: 

Sourcebooks Inc, 2012), 266-267.

[38] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 16.

[39] Howarth, To Shining Sea, 45.

[40] Fredriksen, The United States Navy, 16-18.

[41] Ibid, 18.

[42] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 33.

[43] Ibid, 34.

[44] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 36.

[45] Ibid, 37.

[46] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 20.

[47] Miller, The US Navy, 38-39.

[48] Fredriksen, The United States Navy, 21.

[49] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865:  Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln, NE: 

University of Nebraska, 2012), 42-43.

[50] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 39-40.

[51] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 44.

[52] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 27.

[53] Ibid, 28.

[54] Ibid, 29.

[55] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy:  1775-1991 (New York:  Random House,

1991), 71.

[56] Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea:  A History of the United States Navy:  1775-1991 (New York:  Random House,

1991), 72-76.

[57] Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates:  The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York:  W.W. Norton &

Company, 2006), 189-91.

[58] Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates:  The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York:  W.W. Norton &

Company, 2006), 192-210.

[59] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 33.

[60] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 33.

[61] Ibid, 34-35.

[62] Donald. R. Hickey, ed., The War of 1812:  Writings from America’s Second War of Independence (New York: 

Literary Classics of the United States Inc, 2013), xxii.

[63] N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean:  A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York:  W. W. Norton

& Company, 2004), 567.

[64] Nathan Miller, Broadsides:  The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775-1815 (Edison, NJ:  Castle Books, 2005), 338.

[65] Ibid, 338.

[66] Ibid, 339.

[67] Captain Dacres to Vice Admiral Sawyer, September 7, 1812, in British Public Record Office, Admiralty 1/502,

Part 4, 541-45.

[68] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 40-41.

[69] Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 (Echo Library), 3rd ed., (Middlesex, United Kingdom:  The Echo

Library, 2007), 140.

[70] Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy:  The Making of American Sea Power (New York:  The Free Press, 1991),

85-86.

[71] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 40-41.

[72] Hagan, This People’s Navy, 86.

[73] George Daughan, If By Sea:  The Forging of the American Navy – From the Revolution to the War of 1812 (New

York:  Perseus Books Group, 2008), 414.

[74] Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812:  A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial Edition (Chicago:  University of

Illinois, 2012), 96.

[75] Ibid, 99.

[76] Ibid, 99.

[77] Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812:  A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial Edition (Chicago:  University of

Illinois, 2012), 151-153.

[78] N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean:  A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York:  W. W. Norton

& Company, 2004), 570-572.

[79] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 45.

[80] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865:  Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln, NE: 

University of Nebraska, 2012), 83.

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