HOW FOREIGN COMMERCE LED TO A NAVY

By David Buie

            On an October day in 1784, the American brig Betsy was boarded by Corsairs from Morocco.  The cargo was stolen and the crew was taken prisoner.  The crew was to remain prisoners until July 1786 when Sultan Muhammed Ibn Abdallah signed a commercial agreement with the United States.  Nonetheless, the United States was forced to pay a ransom of $60,000 for the return of the crew of the Betsy.  This was not the last time that pirates from the Barbary States of Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria attacked American shipping.  On July 25, 1785, about a month after selling the last warship of the Continental Navy, Corsairs from Algeria captured the United States schooner Maria and then a week later they took the Dauphin.  Unlike the Ibn Abdallah, the leader of Algeria had no desire to normalize relations with the United States and with America being unable to pay the demanded ransom due to their lack of a navy were unable to force compliance.  As a result, the crews of the Dauphin and Maria remained in custody for a decade.  They were joined by additional crews, and it was not until a $1 million ransom was paid by the United States were they freed.  After the American Revolution, the United States had aspirations to be a commercial nation; however, they soon learned that to be so required a navy adequate to protect its commercial interests on the high seas whether from other nations or pirates, though this was not a lesson learned easily or quickly.[1]

            When the English was defeated at the end of the American Revolution, the war’s defining naval battle was fought between the British Navy and their French counterpart near the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.  The colonies fielded a wide variety of naval forces ranging from the Continental Navy to ten separate state navies.  Even the Continental Army had an ocean going flotilla of ships as well as “brown water” forces that fought the British on rivers and lakes throughout the colonies.  While the Americans won a handful of single ship engagements against the British Navy, most of the American’s naval victories came against British merchant traffic and privateers.

            Even the necessity of a navy was debated.  The fact that the Continental Navy had already been involved in the taking of ships surely helped swing the Continental Congress to vote for the creation of the Continental Navy on November 2, 1775, nearly seven months after hostilities began.[2]

            The end of the Revolution renewed the debate on the necessity of a navy.  However, sectional debates for or against the importance of a navy soon became a moot point as the Continental Congress, operating under the Articles of Confederation, did not have the power to raise funds.  As a result on June 3, 1785, Congress authorized the sale of the last remaining Continental naval vessel, the frigate Alliance.[3]

            The year 1786 found the United States without a navy, currency, or banking facilities and with violent internal trade disputes.  Despite these handicaps, America was able to build up a large merchant marine.  Shortly after the War of Independence was over, American merchant ships could be found in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and even the Pacific Ocean.  Even the weakest of hostile states could take advantage of the United States lack of protection for its merchant ships.[4]

            By the fall of 1787, it became clear to all that the Articles of Confederation, as written, were not working and would have to be amended, at least. And, as some hoped, replaced.  By March of 1787, the Constitution of the United States had been ratified, and a new government formed.

            The new government had two provisions that would be important in the formation of the United States Navy.  The first was that, unlike the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution specifically authorized Congress to provide and maintain a navy.  Though perhaps more important to the formation of the Navy was Article 1 Section 8, which stated, “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties…and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”[5]  Despite these provisions, it would be almost five years before Congress would vote to create a naval force adequate to protect the commerce of the United States.  It passed by just two votes with Northern and Tidewater representatives voting for the proposition and Southern and Inland members voting against the resolution.  The exception was a few South Carolinians who represented mercantile interests.[6]  On March 27, 1794, the Navy Act authorized six frigates, four with 44-guns and two with 36-guns.  However, there was a provision in the act that stated if a treaty with Algeria was reached obtaining the release of the Americans being held by the Barbary State construction on the ships must be halted immediately.  Then in September 1795, a treaty, paying the Dey of Algeria $800,000, was signed.  Opponents of the Navy immediately called for construction of the ships to be halted.  However, President Washington was strongly against this and appealed to Congress to be fiscally responsible.  After much debate, Congress finally agreed that the three ships nearest completion would be finished and work would cease on the other three ships.

            In 1796, the French government recalled its minister and announced it would seek satisfaction of outstanding debts incurred during the American Revolution by taking American shipping.  Then during the winter of 1796, French privateers captured several hundred American ships.  Congress then met and though there were not enough votes to declare war on France.  On July 7, 1797, Congress did vote to rescind its treaties with France, thus began the Quasi-War.  That same day Captain Stephen Decatur Senior, in command of the sloop-of-war, Delaware, captured the French privateer, La Croyable.

            On May 10, 1797, the frigate United States was launched in Philadelphia.  This was followed on September 7, 1797 by the frigate Constellation and then finally on October 21, 1797 the frigate Constitution was launched just a few days after the XYZ Affair is announced.  This led to a national outrage against France.  Then on January 27, 1796, France declares that all vessels that were involved in trade with Britain would be seized and sold.[7]  This led Congress to direct the fledgling United States Navy to begin active operations.  This also led Congress to authorize the purchase or construction of additional warships.

            On April 30, 1798, President Adams appointed Benjamin Stoddert as the first Secretary of the Navy.  By the end of 1798, the United States Navy had cleared the French from North American waters, forcing the French to retreat to the Caribbean.  Stoddert had served as a captain of a Pennsylvania regiment during the Revolutionary War and toward the end of the war he served as Secretary to the Continental Board of War.

            Stoddert, soon after becoming Secretary of the Navy, realized that the United States Navy had too few ships to protect a far-reaching merchant fleet.  So he decided that the United States Navy’s best course of action would be to take the offensive against the Caribbean where the French cruisers and privateers were based.  This strategy proved very successful not only because of Stoddert’s administrative skill in making sure each ship was well stocked and focusing the navies limited strength.

            As secretary, Stoddert not only concerned himself with day-to-day operations, he was also concerned with its future strength.  To this end, he established the first six navy yards.  He also advocated the building of twelve 74-gun ships of the line, of which Congress initially approved construction of six.  However, after a peace accord was signed with France, Congress withdrew funding for the Navy, not only stopping construction of the ships of the line but also reducing the officer corp.  Stoddert left office in 1801.  When he left, he left an able administration.  That ever after would leave the American people a navy to defend their commerce and assert their rights on the high seas.[8] 

            In 1801, Thomas Jefferson was elected President.  Jefferson considered the Barbary pirates his primary foreign policy concern.  Two years earlier, the Journal of the Captivity and Suffering of John Foss was published documenting the mistreatment of Christian prisoners by the Dey of Algiers, which raised the ire of the American public, which further raised Jefferson’s anger.  Captain Bainbridge, of the converted merchantmen George Washington, reported on his voyage to Algeria with a cargo to finish paying the ransom of the American hostages.  After he had unloaded the cargo and was preparing to return to the United States, the Dey informed Bainbridge that his ship was being impressed into service of the Dey to carry his tribute of animals and slaves to the Sultan of Constantinople.  Without support, Bainbridge was forced to comply.  Bainbridge was then forced to carry a return cargo to Algiers.  Upon his return, the Dey threatened to take his ship and throw Bainbridge and his crew in prison.  Only an emissary from the Sultan kept the Dey from following through with his threat.  By the time Bainbridge returned to Washington he was still fuming, as was Jefferson when he received the debriefing.  Jefferson ordered James Madison, the Secretary of State, to write a letter to the Consul General of the Algerian diplomatic mission Richard O’Brien, stating that the incident had “deeply affected the sensibility, not only of the President but the people of the United States.”[9]

            However, what to do about the Barbary States was complicated by two factors.  The first was that just prior to Jefferson’s inauguration the strength of the United States Navy had been greatly reduced.  The second was the fact that Jefferson had promised to cut government spending.  On March 9, 1801, only five days after his inauguration, Jefferson convened his cabinet members to discuss the problem brewing in the Mediterranean.  Jefferson had on a number of occasions voiced his displeasure with the paying of pensions to the Barbary States.  However, the power to declare war resided with Congress, and his cabinet warned Jefferson against attacking any warships without a declaration of war.  Though none of the cabinet objected to sending a squadron to the Mediterranean.  Secretary of State Madison and Secretary of War Henry Dearborn went further by suggesting that the squadron commander could authorize force to protect American commerce.  Four days after the meeting, Madison received a dispatch from James Cathcart, the United States Consul in Tripoli that the Badshaw at Tripoli was preparing for war.  Cathcart also corresponded with his fellow consul in the other Barbary States as Tripoli mobilized.  Jefferson and his cabinet continued discussions until May 15, 1801.  The squadron was sent on its way to the Mediterranean.  The next day, the Badshaw ordered his soldiers to the United States consulate and ordered the flagpole outside the consulate cut down.  This served as the first declaration of war against the United States.  Despite the fact, war had been declared, Congress was not in session and without Congress no declaration of war could be made.  Yet, Jefferson was convinced that he could employee the Navy to protect American lives and commerce.  In a letter to the Badshaw dated May 21, 1801, Jefferson notified the Tripolitan leader that “a squadron of observation [which would] superintend the safety of our commerce and to exercise our seamen in nautical duties.”  Jefferson went on to include a warning to the Badshaw, “we mean to rest the safety of our commerce on the resources of our own strength and bravery in every sea.”[10]

            In July of 1801, Jefferson appointed Robert Smith as his Secretary of the Navy.  Like Stoddart, Smith had served in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War.  Also like Stoddart, he had a background as a maritime merchant.  The Commander of the squadron was Commodore Richard Dale, who had served under John Paul Jones during the Revolutionary War.  The squadron he commanded was comprised of his flagship, the 44-gun frigate President, the 38-gun Philadelphia, the 32-gun Essex, and the sloop of war Enterprise.  Each of the frigates carried crews of about 350 men consisting of both able and ordinary seamen, midshipmen, gunners, surgeons, carpenters, boatman, and Marines.   Dale wasted no time in starting a gunnery practice.  Naval gunnery was a complex undertaking but was a skill that must be mastered if the inexperienced crew was to be a viable fighting force.  The naval guns were the primary weapon of the frigate but just as important to the defense of the ship is the compliment of Marines whose job in battle was to lay down rifle fire and to lob grenades onto the enemy’s vessel.  They were also there to repel any boarding party or as to serve as a boarding party if the Americans had the upper hand.  Though as important as the Marines were, there was some friction between the naval officers and the Marines.  The naval officers believed that on board ship their will was supreme; however, the Marine officers felt that the Marines was under their command.  Though this caused friction, it helped to create a strong esprit de corp in the Marines that survives to the present time.[11]

            The first American ship to reach Gibraltar was the Enterprise.  Her commanding officer Lieutenant Sterrett found the Tripolitan flagship Meshouda (28) along with a 14-gun Tripolitan brig.  However, the Americans could not attack the ship in a neutral harbor.  When Commodore Dale brought the President into the harbor at Gibraltar, he hailed the enemy ship and asked if Tripoli was at war with the United States.  The Tripolitan leader replied that no state of war existed.  However, the information that Dale received in Gibraltar from many other sources was to the contrary.  Dale decided to leave the Philadelphia off-shore lying in wait for the Tripolitan flagship.  The Tripolitans were trapped.  Nevertheless, the Tripolitan commander arranged that his men be transported to the northern coast of Africa where they traveled over land back to Tripoli while he arranges for transport to Malta with the British government at Gibraltar.[12]

            Dale also sent Bainbridge in the Essex to the major ports in Southern Europe where he begins shepherding the American trading vessels.  While many of the American captains were pleased to have the protection, there were some that preferred to sail on their own time table and their own course.  Despite this disregard for their safety the Tripolitans were unable to capture any American ships for the whole of 1801.  Primarily because Bainbridge was protecting convoys, the Philadelphia had the Tripolitan ships bottled up in Gibraltar, and Dale aboard the President and Enterprise blockaded Tripoli.[13] 

            Near the end of July, the President and Enterprise began to run low on water, so Dale sent the Enterprise to Malta to replenish the supply of water.  Then on the morning of August 1, 1801, the Enterprise’s lookout spotted a Barbary corsair.  Sterrett ordered a British ensign flown and approached the ship.  Upon his hail, Sterrett learned that the ship was the Tripoli, and she was commanded by Admiral Rais Mahomet Rous.  He informed Sterrett that he was cruising for American merchantmen.  Upon hearing this, Sterrett ordered the British colors struck, and the stars and stripes raised.  This is how the first battle of the Tripolitan War started.  The gunners on the Enterprise poured broadsides into the Tripoli though the Tripoli had two more cannon than the Enterprise.  Rous could not match the rate of fire from the American ship and attempted to pull alongside and board the ship.  Anticipating this, Sterrett had the Marines under Lieutenant Enoch Lane ready, and when the Tripoli came into range, the Marines swept the Tripoli’s deck.  As the Tripoli pulled away, Sterrett ordered another broadside that smashed Tripoli’s mast, with this the Tripoli’s guns stopped firing, and Rous struck his colors and Sterrett moved in to accept the Tripoli’s surrender.  Yet, instead of surrendering Rous ordered a broadside fired into the American, who responded with their own broadside.  Rous again tried to pull alongside.  Again the Marines repelled the Tripolitan boarding party.  As the Tripoli pulled off, again it was bombarded with another broadside.  Then Rous again feigned surrender.  When Sterrett failed to be fooled again, the Tripolitan for a third time tried to board the Enterprise.  This time Sterrett moved off and ordered the ship sunk.  At this, Rous threw his colors in the sea and bent over the rail of the Tripoli in supplication.  Sterrett then sent a longboat over to the Tripoli and found a battered ship with thirty killed and another thirty wounded out of a crew of eighty.  In contrast, the Enterprise had no killed or wounded.[14]  As the enlistments of the crew of the President were coming to an end, Dale set sail for Norfolk and landed on April 14, 1802.  Dale, upon his return, asked for a promotion to Admiral.  Though, at the time this rank did not exist in the United States Navy.  Dale then lobbied Congress to create it. When this failed, Dale resigned from the Navy.  Ultimately, he accomplished little other than protecting American trade and capturing a few Tripolitan ships.[15]

            Though Dale’s experience in the Mediterranean was not a sweeping military accomplishment.  Its most lasting effect was demonstrating the President needed more flexibility to expand the navy’s presence in the Mediterranean.  As a result, on February 1, 1802 Congress passed the act for the protection of the commerce and seamen of the United States against Tripolitan cruisers.  The law removed the restrictions on the Navy imposed by the Peace Establishment Act.  However, Jefferson did not take advantage of the 1802 act and in his annual address to Congress stated any changes to the American Armed Forces would not be necessary.[16]  On April 27, 1802, Jefferson, at the urging of Secretary Smith, strengthened the Mediterranean squadron though not by near as much as Smith had hoped.  The new commanding officer of the squadron was Commodore Richard Morris whose flagship, the 36-gun Chesapeake.  The other ships of the squadron consisted of the 36-gun frigates the New York and Constellation; the 28-gun frigates the John Adams, the Adams, the Boston; and the sloop of war Enterprise.  Morris was in many ways different than Dale.  Morris, who brought along his wife and daughter, acted as if he was on a pleasure cruise.  This was largely because of his inactivity.  President Jefferson relieved him on June 21, 1803 and after a court martial, Morris was dismissed from the service.  Then on July 13, 1803, Jefferson appointed Captain Edward Preble who rendezvoused with the squadron which now consisted of the 44-gun Constitution, 36-gun New York, 28-gun John Adams, and the 12-gun Vixen and Nautilus.

              Despite perhaps greatest setback of the war happening under Preble’s command, the capture of the Philadelphia which ran aground while it was blockading Tripoli.  Preble was able to coordinate a raid that scuttled the Philadelphia and as well as bombarding Tripoli on ten separate occasions during his tour, which ended on September 9, 1804.  Within a year of Preble’s tour, the Badshaw agreed to accept a ransom for Captain Bainbridge and his crew for $60,000 and waived all claim to any future tribute.  While the Navy was able to end the threat to trade that Tripoli represented, at least temporarily, more importantly the Tripolitan War served as a finishing school for the United States Navy’s young officer corp.[17]

            After the ships returned to the United States from the Mediterranean, they were taken out of service.  By the beginning of 1807, only the Constitution was still at sea.  Then early in 1807, Secretary of the Navy Smith ordered the Chesapeake back into service to relieve the Constitution.  However, in assembling the crew, several British deserters signed on.  Then on June 22, 1807, the Chesapeake encountered the British ship HMS Leopard, which came alongside and demanded permission to search for deserters aboard the Chesapeake.  The Chesapeake refused and the captain of the Leopard ordered a broadside fired into the Chesapeake.  As a result, the American ship took twenty causalities and was in no position to fight back.  The Chesapeake surrendered, and four men were removed.[18]  The country was outraged and though Jefferson had contemplated war soon he realized with thousands of vulnerable merchants at sea this was a wise course of action.

            Jefferson soon took a different tack and chose to cut off all trade, not only with Britain but all of Europe and its colonies.  This embargo was extremely detrimental to American merchants, particularly those in New England that depended more on foreign trade.  The embargo forced American traders to seek new markets, especially China who had marketable products.  However, the early traders found that most traders in China desired liquid currency a commodity in short supply in the New Republic.  However, there were come commodities that traders were willing to trade in furs and to a limited extent ginseng.  The primary trade objects, sea otter pelts, required a side trip to trade for the pelts from Native American’s in the Pacific Northwest.  This, however, provided its own problem in tha.t Native Americans could be fickle trading partners.  In some cases American traders, unable to trade successfully with natives, turned smuggler and traded illegally (by Spanish law) with the Spanish colonists in California, which became legal in 1821 with Mexico’s independence.   These new markets for American trade as well as protective tariffs, such as the Navigation Act of 1789 which put a charge of $0.40 per ton and United States Tariff Act of 1789 which put an additional 12.5% tax on “Asiatic” goods imported into the United States by foreign carriers, demonstrated the American desire to protect American trade.[19]

            Although in the years after peace is declared with Tripoli, Jefferson’s reduction of the Navy made protection of the merchant marine difficult.  Though during this time of peace most merchant ships traveled unmolested except by British Navy ships that were in need of manpower that occasionally sought to fill out there crews by the impressment of “British” subjects that were serving on board American merchant vessels.  This was not a new issue.  As early as 1796, Congress passed the For the Protection and Relief of American Seamen Act, which authorized the issuance of “seamen protection certificates”.  Though the certificates were easily forged, it was also easy for British deserters to get them through fraudulent means.  So in many instances the “protections” were ignored while the evidence does seem to support the fact that a large number of British subjects served on American merchant and naval vessels.  Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury estimated 5,000 British seamen serving in the United States merchant fleet in 1803.  Also in 1803, American Captain Edward Preble complained, “I don’t have 20 native American sailors on board,” this being said of a crew of 165.  In addition, a cruise of the Constellation in 1807, the same year as the Leopard/Chesapeake issue occurred, it was believed of the 419 sailors, 149 were British subjects.[20]

            In 1809, Madison was elected president and the Embargo Act ended and was replaced by the Non-Intercourse Act in 1809.[21]  Madison had no loyalty to either the French or the British; he felt that each were ultimately bad for America.  Madison felt America’s only course of action was to either submit to oppression from both France and Britain, to withdraw American commerce from the high seas, or war.  None of which were good options.[22]  On April 7, 1809 talks began between Madison and British Ambassador David Erskine.  Within six weeks Erskine and Madison had reached an agreement to open trade between the United States and Britain.  Nevertheless, the agreement was rejected by George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, who unknown to Madison had required Erskine to obtain permission to stop all private vessels of the United States.  Erskine knew Madison would not agree to such a manner and had left it off the table.  Canning withdrew Erskine and replaced him with the brusque Francis Jackson, whose undiplomatic demeanor was taken by Madison as an insult.  The United States were in no shape for war.  The Navy had few warships other than Jefferson’s gunboats.  Upon the ending of the Embargo Act, Jefferson’s acting Secretary of the Navy, Charles Goldsbourgh, ordered 86 of 165 of Jefferson’s gunboats laid up in ordinary (put into reserve), with New Orleans being allowed to keep its full twenty-six boat compliments.  Goldsbourgh also began the reactivation of as many warships as possible.  Naval commands along the Eastern seaboard were divided between John Rogers in New York; Stephen Decatur in Norfolk; and two smaller stations in Charleston, South Carolina and New Orleans.  John Rogers had the largest portion of the navy’s operational fleet under his command which consisted of his flagship the 44-gun President; the 44-gun Constitution, commanded by Captain Isaac Hull; the 32-gun Essex under David Porter; the 18-gun brig Argus under Lieutenant James Lawrence; and twenty gunboats.  Commodore Stephen Decatur’s command included his flagship the 44-gun United States, the 38-gun Congress, 16-gun sloop of war Wasp, the 14-gun Nautilus, and fourteen gunboats.[23]  In 1809, Madison appointed Paul Hamilton as the Secretary of the Navy.  Like all of his predecessors, Hamilton had served in the Continental Army, yet unlike his predecessors Hamilton had no maritime experience.  Yet, he was a proponent of a strong navy.[24]

            Madison, in his 1809 State of the Union address, appealed to Congress for an increased military budget.  Nonetheless, on April 16, 1810, Congress voted to reduce the military budget in order to save money.  The Congress, however, did authorize the government to obtain a five million dollar loan and then on May 1, 1810 Congress passed Macon’s Bill Number Two which opened trade including Britain and France.  The legislation was noticed by Napoleon, who publicly voiced intentions to repeal orders that had interfaced with American trade.  Though Madison was aware of Napoleon’s duplicitousness, he chose to proceed as if Napoleon was genuine.  John Quincy Adam’s, the ambassador to Russia, then sent a message to Madison warning that Napoleon was attempting to trap America into a war with England.  Despite this warning and the fact that American shipping in and out of French ports continued to be confiscated, an inconvenient fact that Madison ignored.  At the same time, London received a warning that per the Macon Act that trade would be cut off if the cabinet did not remove the orders in council.  Yet the British continued to blockade New York, where it continued to stop American ships and impress seamen from American ships.  One particularly provocative incidence occurred on May 1, 1811.  The British frigate Guerriere and her companion ship Melampus appeared off Sandy Hook and began stopping American ships.  One of which, the brig Spitfire, was chased down by the Guerriere’s Captain Dacres, who proceeded to search the Spitfire and impressed John Diggio, who was serving as an apprentice to the ships master.  The incident was highly publicized and resulted in widespread indignation.  Hamilton ordered Rodgers back to New York.  Along with the order, Rodgers was reminded of the navies wounded honor and the low morale of the country.  Then on May 16, 1811 an unknown sail was spotted about forty-five miles northeast of Cape Henry.  The stranger had her sails spread and was on a bearing that led her toward the President.  As the ship drew closer, it suddenly changed course and began to bear away.  Rodgers gave chase thinking that the ship might be the Guerriere.  Rodgers had hopes of “liberating” Diggio.  After about eight hours of chase, the distance between the ships was diminishing, and both ships were readied for battle.  By this time, it was growing dark.  Rodgers then hailed the Little Belt requesting identification.  The hail was answered by a shot that struck the main mast of the President.  Rodgers returned fire, and the battle continued for about ten minutes until the Little Belt’s guns fell silent.  At this time, Rodgers order cease-fire.  However, after a brief respite the British ship began firing again.  The American ship then returned fire to great effect, prompting Captain Bingham of the Little Belt to strike her colors.  Shortly after sunrise, Rogers sent a boat over to see if it could be of assistance and to apologize.  Bingham politely refused Rodger’s aid and limped back to Halifax.  The incident had left thirteen dead, and nineteen wounded onboard the Little Belt and only one wounded onboard the President.[25]  In the United States, the event was looked upon with the pride of the wronged being avenged, while in Britain the incident was held up as a justification of their low opinion of the United States Navy.  However after the engagement both sides feel an increase in tensions. While most of the United States was pleased with Rodgers’ “victory”, merchants in both New England and Britain lobbied for a relaxation of tensions.  While the British merchants were ultimately able to convince the British government to repeal the restrictive trade practices known as the Orders-in-Council. The merchants in New England, however, were unable to dissuade the “war hawks” led by representatives from the south and the west that longed to gain control of Canada.  This desire culminated in the vote by the United States Congress on June 18, 1812 to declare war on one of the greatest powers of the day.[26]  The stated reasons for the declaration of war by the United States were all tied to maritime trade and American sovereignty on the open seas, whether it was the issue of impressment of American sailors, the looting of American shipping, or the Orders-in-Council.[27]

            Though there was debate on the importance of the stated reasons for declaring war when weighed against the war hawk’s desire to annex Canada.  It is clear that each of these played a part in the American decision to declare war. On June 18, 1812, the American Navy, which consisted of seventeen warships compared to the 1,048 warships of the Royal Navy, and of the seventeen American warships only seven had more than thirty-five guns.[28]  To put it another way, the British Navy was armed with 27,800 cannon compared to only 450 cannon fielded by the United States Navy. Secretary of the Navy Hamilton met with his senior commanders to discuss how to best use America's Navy to combat the much larger force Britain had at its disposal. They decided it would be in their advantage to avoid fleet actions and to use the frigates in single-ship engagements to destroy as many ships as possible before the inevitable blockade.[29]  In response to this strategy President Madison stated, “It is victories we want; if you give us them and lose your ships afterward, they can be replaced by other.”[30]  The strategy played out well for the Americans during the first year of the war.  During this time the American Navy won some key ship-on-ship engagements over British frigates Guerriere on August 19, 1812 over the Macedonian on October 25, 1812 and the Java on November 29, 1812.[31]  So effective were the American frigates, the British Admiralty ordered British frigates not “to engage, single handed the larger class of American ships; which though they may be called frigates…resemble line of battle ships.”[32]  During the war the United States Navy was not the only force to be contended with because Congress issued more than 500 letters of marque which during the first six months of the war these privateers were responsible for the capture of 450 British ships while just two successful privateers were responsible for the loss of over $1.8 million in lost revenue.  These losses prompted the British government to order all British merchant men in the Atlantic to sail in convoy.[33]

            Unfortunately this was the high water mark for the Americans.  By July, Britain had increased its naval presence in North America to 129 ships including 10 ships of the line.  With this increase in ships, the British were able to do what they had never done during the Revolutionary War; blockade the entire Atlantic Coast.[34]  After the summer of 1813, the navy’s opportunities were few and far in between.  The only American warship of any size at sea was the Essex and it was all the way in the Pacific harassing British whaling.  Only small warships were able to slip past the blockade, and that became less frequent as the year went by.

            As 1814 went on, the United States was the only combatant left to draw Britain’s ire.  However, after almost twenty years of almost continuous warfare, Britain was ready for peace and on December 24, 1814 delegates from Britain and the United States met in Ghent, Belgium and signed a peace treaty ending the War of 1812.  Though there were battles still fought for the next two months, they were of no consequence as the Treaty of Ghent was ratified by the United States Senate on February 17, 1815.[35] 

            With the end of the war, Madison wasted no time in requesting a declaration of war on the Barbary States of Algeria, which had violated the previously signed agreement.  Gone was last vestiges of Republican anti-navalism.[36]  Madison dispatched two squadrons to the Mediterranean.  Stephen Decatur in his new flagship, the 44-gun Guerrier, the 44-gun Macedonian, and 36-gun Constellation and seven smaller ships were sent ahead as an advance squadron with Captain Bainbridge to follow in his new flagship, the 74-gun Independence, the 44-gun frigates United States and Congress and six smaller vessels.  By the time Bainbridge reached Algeria, Decatur had already forced the Dey of Algeria to surrender the crews of the captured American ships as well as forcing the Dey to pay reparation to the owners of the taken American vessels.  In addition, Decatur ended the payment of tribute by the Americans.  Decatur then visited the states of Tunis and Tripoli which had also violated treaties with the United States and soon received similar agreements from them.  The two American squadrons independently cruised the Mediterranean making numerous ports of call demonstrating American strength.  Then in October 1815, the two squadrons had a rendezvous at Gibraltar.  The two commanders both believed that only an American naval presence would be able to deter further hostile actions.  A sentiment that was shared by the Secretary of State, James Monroe, who agreed and this led to the formation of a squadron tasked with protecting American commerce.[37]  In addition to the squadron in the Mediterranean, on March 3, 1819, the United States formed an additional squadron for the protection of American trade in the West Indies, followed shortly by the foundation of a squadron in the Pacific in 1821 and by 1835 the East Indian squadron is established to cover American trade in the China Sea.[38] 

            In order to man these squadrons, Congress passed the act for the gradual increase of the Navy.  In April of 1816, this law authorized the construction of nine battleships and twelve heavy frigates at the cost of $1 million a year for eight years.[39]  Included in this building program was another six 18-gun sloops.  This was the most ambitious building program before the outbreak of the Civil War.  The United States was never able to live up to the ambition falling short of money to complete all the ships and falling short of men to man them.  All the frigates were eventually completed; however, only four of them were launched by 1830.  Throughout the 1820s and 1830s the Navy did not have an enemy but it did have a mission; the protection of American commerce.

            Though it would not be until the twentieth century that the United States would be considered among the leading navies of the world.  After the lessons learned in the years preceding and following the War of 1812, the United States were able to become a leader in trade in all areas of the world most significantly because even though America’s fleet was not the largest or its ships the biggest, however, the fact that America had a navy that was present wherever American merchant ships did business.

 

 

 

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[1] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865:  Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln, NE: 

University of Nebraska, 2012), 34-35.

[2] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-CLIO,

LLC, 2010), 1-2.

[3] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 32.

[4] Howard I. Chapelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their Development (New York:  W.

W. Norton & Company, 1949), 116-117.

[5] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, retrieved from http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#a1_sec8.

[6] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 36.

[7] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865:  Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln, NE: 

University of Nebraska, 2012), 41-42.

[8] “Benjamin Stoddert:  1751-18 December 1813,” Naval History & Heritage Command, accessed April 15, 2015,

http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/bios/stoddert-benjamin.html.

[9] A.B.C. Whipple, To the Shore of Tripoli:  The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines (New York:  William Morrow

and Company Inc, 1991), 61-63.

[10] A.B.C. Whipple, To the Shore of Tripoli:  The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines (New York:  William Morrow

and Company Inc, 1991), 64-65.

[11] A.B.C. Whipple, To the Shore of Tripoli:  The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines (New York:  William Morrow

and Company Inc, 1991), 74-76.

[12] Ibid, 76-77.

[13] Ibid, 78-80.

[14] A.B.C. Whipple, To the Shore of Tripoli:  The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines (New York:  William Morrow

and Company Inc, 1991), 80.

[15] A.B.C. Whipple, To the Shore of Tripoli:  The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines (New York:  William Morrow

and Company Inc, 1991), 81.

[16] George Daughan, If By Sea:  The Forging of the American Navy – From the Revolution to the War of 1812 (New

York:  Perseus Books Group, 2008), 59-60.

[17] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 34-35.

[18] Jonathan R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865:  Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln, NE: 

University of Nebraska, 2012), 53.

[19] William J. Barger, “New Players at the Table:  How Americans Came to Dominate Early Trade in the North

Pacific,” Southern California Quarterly 90, no. 3 (Fall 2008):  251.

[20] Ronald D. Utt, Ships of Oak Guns of Iron:  The War of 1812 and the Forging of the American Navy (Washington,

DC:  Regnery History, 2012), 3-5.

[21] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 60.

[22] George Daughan, If By Sea:  The Forging of the American Navy – From the Revolution to the War of 1812 (New

York:  Perseus Books Group, 2008), 396-400.

[23] George Daughan, If By Sea:  The Forging of the American Navy – From the Revolution to the War of 1812 (New

York:  Perseus Books Group, 2008), 398-400.

[24] Ibid, 398-400.

[25] George Daughan, If By Sea:  The Forging of the American Navy – From the Revolution to the War of 1812 (New

York:  Perseus Books Group, 2008), 404-405.

[26] Ronald D. Utt, Ships of Oak Guns of Iron:  The War of 1812 and the Forging of the American Navy (Washington,

DC:  Regnery History), 25-27.

[27] Donald. R. Hickey, ed., The War of 1812:  Writings from America’s Second War of Independence (New York: 

Literary Classics of the United States Inc, 2013), xxii.

[28] N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean:  A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York:  W. W. Norton

& Company, 2004), 567.

[29] Frances Diane Robotti and James Bescovi, The USS Essex and the Birth of the American Navy (Holbrook, MA:  Adams Media Corporation, 1999), 152-153.

[30] Ibid, 153.

[31] Andrew Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail (London:  Cassell & Co, 2000), 190-195.

[32] Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812:  A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial Edition (Chicago:  University of

Illinois, 2012), 99.

[33] Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812:  A Forgotten Conflict, Bicentennial Edition (Chicago:  University of

Illinois, 2012), 99.

[34] Ibid, 151-153.

[35] John C. Fredriksen, The United States Navy:  A Chronology, 1775 to the Present (Santa Barbara, CA:  ABC-

CLIO, LLC, 2010), 45.

[36] Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates:  The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York:  W.W. Norton &

Company, 2006), 456.

[37] Nathan Miller, The US Navy:  A History, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 1997), 81-82.

[38] Ibid, 83-89.

[39] Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates:  The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York:  W.W. Norton &

Company, 2006), 45-47.

 

Bibliography

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“Benjamin Stoddert:  1751-18 December 1813.” Naval History & Heritage Command.  Accessed

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Daughan, George.  If By Sea:  The Forging of the American Navy – From the Revolution to the

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Dull, Jonathan R.  American Naval History, 1607-1865:  Overcoming the Colonial Legacy. 

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